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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the reasons why it took seventy-four years for the International 
Criminal Court to be officially established in Rome in 1998 after the idea for the Court was 
first mooted in 1924. It is argued that the processes of myth-construction were pivotal in 
contributing to the Court’s enduring identity crisis throughout this period. Based on evidence 
pertinent to this inquiry, the thesis challenges the conventional histories that frame the Court’s 
evolution within a teleological development of international criminal law. The jurists, Dr 
Hugh H.L. Bellot (1860–1928) and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (1897–1960) are key sources in 
supporting the ultimate hypothesis proposed here – that is, the recent perceptions of the 
Court’s genesis within the late nineteenth century Red Cross movement originated from the 
1998 Rome Conference. This strategic myth was orchestrated with the chief purpose of 
unifying the interests of national delegates and international Civil Society by suppressing any 
future political doubt of the Court’s humanitarian function. 
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5 
Introduction 
 
Revisiting the “Invented Traditions” of the 
International Criminal Court 
 
  
 
Traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented […] 
they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. – Eric Hobsbawm.1 
   
The evolution of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a conspicuously 
unchartered field of historical inquiry. The Court as it functions today, was formally proposed 
during the United Nations (UN) diplomatic conference in Rome in 1998, and subsequently, 
was officially inaugurated in 2002.2 Its genesis, however, can be traced back further to the 
“minor utopias” of international lawyers, focused on Europe at the dawn of the twentieth 
century.3 Although in recent decades the history of the ICC has predominantly attracted legal 
scholars and political scientists, whom revelled in a constitutional history of criminal law, 
there has been limited investigation on why the Court took nearly a century to become more 
than a reality on paper.4 This thesis offers original insight into the processes through which 
                                                        
1 Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1. 
2 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13, “United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records”, 
vol. 1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and Final Act of the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(New York: United Nations, 2002). 
3 Jay Winter employs the term “minor utopia” to describe individual visionaries of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, whose plans for world change “took as their point of departure a different set of 
upheavals arising from collective violence”. Jay Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian 
Moments in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 5. 
4 Constitutionalism has been the key focus of the following legal studies, which use history to provide 
an account of precedent, rather than an account of the past: William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); William A. Schabas, 
Unimaginable atrocities: justice, politics, and rights at the war crimes tribunals (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, eds., ICC ratification and national implementing 
legislation (Toulouse: Eros, 1999); Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide 
Convention. (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 1991); Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John 
R.W.D. Jones, eds., The Rome statute of the international criminal court: a commentary (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Nidal Nabil Jurdi, International Criminal Court and National 
6 
the politics of myth-making guided the Court’s path; from an abstract utopian ideal, to a 
central institution at the core of our modern global infrastructure. In doing so, the study shall 
dispel the traditionally perceived continuity in the Court’s historical trajectory by revisiting its 
history of opposition. 
The Court, in common with a large number of historic institutions, has its own 
“invented traditions”.5 These are employed to trim the edges of what may be an inconvenient 
narrative of the past. Throughout the twentieth century, the international community has 
endorsed various foundation myths to become a doctrine in which a group’s values have been 
based. The current study’s interest is not limited to the extent to which myths have been 
created, but also intriguingly, why people chose to reject or embrace them. Identification of 
these myths is the first step in explaining the processes that led to their birth, and importantly, 
understanding the impact upon their receivers, perpetuators and dissidents.  
Two schools of thought currently overshadow these gaps in the historical record – 
one tracing the Court’s lineage within a broader teleology of expanding international criminal 
law throughout the twentieth century, and the other emphasising its humanitarian origins. 
Grand narratives of the ICC’s linear progress were first raised in 1950, when the Special 
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Ricardo J. Alfaro identified the ICC within 
a larger landscape of building international tribunals.6 For Alfaro, the creation of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice at the meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists 
at the Peace Palace of The Hague in 1920 was year zero in the ICC’s history.7 Michael J. 
Struett alternatively traces the ICC’s origins to the first meeting of The American Society for 
                                                        
Courts: A Contentious Relationship, eds., Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2011); Lindsey Stevenson and Steven Ratner, “The Genocide Convention after 
Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for Combating a Crime Against Humanity”, American Society of 
International Law, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, (1998), pp. 1–19; Salvatore Zappalá, Human 
Rights and International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2003); Hector 
Olasolo, Essays on International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
5 Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, p. 1. 
6 Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur, “Report on the Question of International Jurisdiction”, 
Document A/CN.4/15 and Corr. 1, Extracts from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
vol. 2, (1950). 
7 Alfaro, “Report on the Question of International Jurisdiction”, p. 3. 
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the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in Baltimore on 6 February 1910.8 The 
United States Secretary of State Philander Chase Know, President William Howard Taft, 
Andrew Carnegie and Elihu Root were present at this meeting where the invention of an 
impartial and permanent court of justice was discussed.9 Leila Nadya Sadat considers the 
Court’s genesis to be rooted in the 1899 and 1907 International Peace Conferences at The 
Hague.10 While Sadat acknowledges that the “ICC has been in the ‘shadowland’ […] for the 
entire twentieth century” on account of numerous “conceptual, legal and political obstacles”, 
she offers no further explanation of why national powers never “officially considered” the 
idea until 1998.11 To date, the observation that “the Rome Treaty was the natural destination 
of The Hague Conferences” is one that remains unchallenged.12  
 Legal scholars Nina H.B. JØrgensen and Jean H. Quataert have each extrapolated on 
this view in recent decades by focusing on the latter half of the twentieth century.13 They 
believed the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals of 1945 and 1946, the 
Genocide Conventions of 1937 and 1946–1948, the ad hoc tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), and the Special Hybrid Courts for Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina were following one path leading to 
Rome in 1998. Louis Henkin, a prominent American scholar of contemporary international 
                                                        
8 Michael J. Struett, The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse 
and Agency (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2008), p. 69; See primary source: The American 
Journal for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, “The American Journal for the Judicial 
Settlement of International Disputes”, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 4, no. 4, (Oct. 
1910), pp. 930–932.  
9 Struett, The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court, p. 69. 
10 Leila Nadya Sadat, “The Evolution of the ICC: From The Hague to Rome and Back Again”, in Sarah 
B. Sewell and Carl Kaysen, eds., The United States and the International Criminal Court: National 
Security and International Law (Lanham, Md; Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 
p. 31. 
11 Sadat, “The Evolution of the ICC”, pp. 32, 34. 
12 Sadat, “The Evolution of the ICC”, p. 31. 
13 Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The responsibility of states for international crimes (Oxford, England; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 3–24; Jean H. Quataert, Advocating dignity: human rights 
mobilizations in global politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 251. 
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law, subscribed to this belief when stating, “from Nuremberg one can see a direct line […] to 
the ICC launched at Rome in 1998”.14 
 The second school of thought is the “promotional view”, whereby the ICC is 
promoted as a “moral achievement in spite of and against politics”.15 At the Rome Conference 
in 1998, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan portrayed the ICC as an “historic milestone” in 
an ancient struggle to voice the humanitarian spirit of “international Civil Society” – a phrase 
in modern usage describing a global body of non-government organisations that share a 
collective interest in the preservation of human dignity.16 “The road leading to the holding of 
the Conference in the Eternal City”, Annan proclaimed, “had been a long one, passing 
through some of the darkest moments in human history”.17 The Rome myth was perpetuated 
by members of the Conference and subsequent scholars to ground the ICC’s origins within 
the latter nineteenth century work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).18 
Contrary to this sustained belief, nineteenth century British newspaper archives, as well as the 
published and miscellaneous writings of figures overlooked, but nevertheless closely involved                                                         
14 Louis Henkin, “Human Rights: Ideology and Inspiration, Reality and Prospect” in Samantha Power 
and Graham Allison eds., Realizing human rights: moving from inspiration to impact (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 9; See also: Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal 
Proceedings, p. 8; Robert F. Gorman and Edward S. Mihalkanin, eds., Historical Dictionary of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Organisations (Lanham, Maryland; Toronto; Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow 
Press, Inc., 2007), p. 158–159. 
15 Samuel Moyn, “Promotion and its limits, Part 3: Four ways to talk about the ICC: politics, 
promotion, professionalism and preservation”, Humanity, available at 
http://www.humanityjournal.org/blog/2013/01/promotion-and-its-limits-icc-pt-3, last accessed 17 May 
2013; Moyn provides three additional frameworks for conceptualising the ICC: the “political view” 
describes ICC as an international project with multiple intersecting agendas; the “professional view” 
portrays the Court as a vocational experience for contemporary international lawyers; and the 
“preservation view” considers the aims of contemporary political actors to justify the existence of the 
Court. 
16 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.1, “United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records”, 
vol. 2. Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole 
(New York: United Nations, 2002), p. 61. 
17 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.1, p. 61. 
18 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, p. 2; Arthur Watts, The International 
Law Commission 1949-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 1447; Christopher Keith Hall, 
‘The first proposal for a permanent international criminal court’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, no. 322, (1998), pp. 1-12; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, “The International Criminal Court: Seeking 
Global Justice”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 40, no. 215, (2008), p. 216; 
William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Palgrave, 1998), p. 
524; Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “History of the ICC”, Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, available at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory, last accessed 7 
June, 2013. 
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in the idea of an ICC throughout the twentieth century, appear remarkably silent on the 
Court’s genealogy in the Red Cross movement – a persistent amnesia within historical 
sources that remains unexplored. 
 This thesis interprets and dissects the conventional narratives by drawing from an 
alternate body of scholarship: one that emphasises the primacy of language and context. 
Herbert M. Butterfield criticises “the Whig historian” who “oversimplifies the historical 
process” by reading “history from the point of view of his present day”.19 Indeed, this is the 
predominant form that much legal history has followed until recently, and one that many legal 
historians continue to follow. Robert Cryer notes in his comprehensive work on the 
enforcement of international criminal law since the late 1980s, that “it would be easy to write 
a simple ‘Whig history’ of international law, but that would be inaccurate”.20 Emmanuelle 
Jouannet scrutinises the “various changing purposes” of international law throughout the 
seventeenth to twenty-first centuries.21 She breaks her study “down into periods” in order to 
examine the dualism of international law, that on one hand, protects the interests of nation-
states, and on the other, safeguards the “well-being of the world’s people” – a phenomenon 
she terms the “liberal-welfarist” crisis.22 From this perspective, Samuel Moyn candidly rejects 
the “promotional” view that turns a blind eye to the history of conflict in the ICC’s 
development and the manner in which the Court’s historically intended purpose has not 
remained static in time.23  
 This study traces the experiences and political philosophies of individual lawyers as 
a lens through which to contest Whig narratives and survey the extent to which politically 
motivated distortions of history were driving forces in the progression and retrogression of                                                         
19 Herbert Butterfield, The whig interpretation of history (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1931), p. 40. 
20 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting international crimes: selectivity and the international criminal law 
regime (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 9. 
21 Emmanuelle Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: History of International Law 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 1. 
22 Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations, pp. 1, 8. 
23 Samuel Moyn, “The political context of international criminal justice, Part 4: Four ways to talk about 
the ICC: politics, promotion, professionalism and preservation”, Humanity, 
http://www.humanityjournal.org/blog/2013/01/promotion-and-its-limits-icc-pt-3, last accessed 17 May 
2013. 
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the ICC. This approach has its roots in the contextualism of a number of historical 
methodologies, including the credo of Marc Bloch, who argues the need to distinguish 
between “beginnings” and “explanations” by providing language with an historical 
resonance.24 Clifford Geertz terms this method the “semiotic approach” in his anthropological 
study The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), which seeks to gain “access to the conceptual 
world in which our subjects live so that we can […] converse with them”.25 While Jay Winter 
warns against the risks of “an uncritical distance towards thinkers and their projects”, Martti 
Koskenniemi, in his evolutionary tome of international law extending from 1870 to 1960, 
strikes a balance between grand historical narratives that “flatten the work of individual 
lawyers” and realist approaches that frown upon “the assumption that individual lives could 
have a significant effect on the grand course of international politics”.26  
 Chapter One analyses the motivations of British international lawyer, Dr. Hugh H.L. 
Bellot (1860 – 1928), who is credited as author and presented the first official statute of the 
ICC at the Stockholm Conference of the International Law Association (ILA) in 1924. I will 
argue that the hierarchy of competing myths about international civilisation that emerged in 
Europe, and especially from within Britain, during the aftermath of the First World War was a 
significant factor in the rejection of Bellot’s proposal. This rationale challenges the 
conventional wisdom expressed by contemporary scholarship that the idea of an ICC 
possessed direct roots in the legacies of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and 
the subsequent creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920. As a result, 
Bellot’s liberal vision of Anglo-American civilisation will be used as a yardstick to measure 
the extent to which perceptions of the Court’s history, purpose and legitimacy transformed or 
endured throughout the twentieth century. Importantly, it also enables an examination of the 
                                                        
24 Marc Bloch, The historian's craft, trans., Peter Putnam (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1954), p. 32. 
25 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
Publishers, 1973), p. 24. 
26 Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom, pp. 6–7; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 7-8.  
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relationships between “invented traditions” and the international political cultures from which 
they have evolved. 
 Chapter Two examines the Austrian international lawyer, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s 
(1897 – 1960) universal vision of individual human rights as a perspective through which to 
explore the newly discovered understanding of the ICC in the mid-twentieth century. His 
motivations for supporting the Nuremberg Tribunal (1945 – 1946) as a foundation myth of 
the Court, and the manner in which the ICC became an evolving institutional expression of 
rights shall be focal points of analysis. This analysis serves as a contextual basis for revisiting 
the contentious relationship between the ICC and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, which on 18 April 1946 became a judicial organ of the UN, known as the 
International Court of Justice. Whilst many of Bellot’s contemporaries recognised the 
Permanent Court of International Justice as a superior tool for the preservation of 
international civilisation during the 1920s, the inability of the International Court of Justice to 
overrule sovereign states was noted by various Eastern and Western Governments of the UN 
as a warning of the difficulties to be faced by an ICC, when enforcing individual rights and 
responsibilities as new a standard of international law. The mid-twentieth century marked a 
significant transformation in the differences between these two Courts. The “strange triumph” 
of the “human rights revolution”, combined with Lauterpacht’s loss of faith in the 
effectiveness of international courts will be a benchmark for measuring why the Nuremberg 
Myth was an unstable foundation upon which to build international support for the creation of 
an ICC during the 1950s.27 
 Chapter Three uses the previous two sections as a platform to argue that historical 
accounts of the ICC’s genesis in the Red Cross Movement of the late nineteenth century were 
an “invented tradition” of the 1998 Rome Conference. This foundation myth aimed to conceal                                                         
27 According to Mark Mazower, the UN’s adoption of international human rights rhetoric after the 
Second World War was a “strange triumph” for they had not succeeded in becoming an enforceable 
legal concept in the period. See: Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950”, 
The Historical Journal, 47(2), 2004, pp. 379-398; For an historiographical overview of contemporary 
human rights history, see: Devin O. Pendas, “Toward a New politics? On the Recent Historiography of 
Human Rights”, Contemporary European History, vol. 21, no. 1, (2012), pp. 95-111. 
12 
competing hegemonies at the Conference and served to dissipate political doubt of the 
Court’s humanitarian role in a decade when international politics were sharply divided 
between the rival demands of nation states and international Civil Society. Up to this point in 
time, the fragmentation of the ICC’s ideological mission had been an overwhelming obstacle 
to its establishment, to such an extent that neither Bellot nor Lauterpacht were able to 
translate their own visions of the Court into a reality. In 1998, fresh perceptions of the past 
drew upon the power of collective experience that played a key role in the politics of consent 
in Rome.  
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Chapter One 
 
A Discourse on Civilisation: 
Dr Hugh H.L. Bellot and the Alter Ego of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
 
  
 
At the Buenos Aires Conference, 1922, it was resolved: ‘That in the opinion of this Conference the 
creation of an International Criminal Court is essential in the interests of justice and that the Conference 
is of the opinion that the matter is one of urgency.’ It was also resolved that Dr. Bellot be instructed to 
draft the Statute for this Court and to submit it to a Committee of the Association […] the Court shall 
apply […] the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. – Dr Hugh H.L. Bellot at the 
Stockholm Conference in 1924.28 
 
This chapter will examine Dr Hugh H.L. Bellot’s liberal vision of Anglo-American 
civilisation at the dawn of the twentieth century as a perspective through which to investigate 
the purpose of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It will argue against universalist 
interpretations of the ICC’s development, to instead frame the Court’s genesis within a 
discourse on civilisation. In so doing, it will seek to identify the manner in which the ICC’s 
ideological mission was fractured by the competing modes of international civilisation that 
emerged in the aftermath of the First World War – a fracture that ultimately prevented the 
implementation of Bellot’s proposal at the Stockholm Conference of the International Law 
Association (ILA) in 1924. For Bellot, the ICC provided opportunities to defend his Victorian 
upper-middle class perception of civilisation by reinforcing nineteenth century critiques 
against ius positum,29 to humanise the laws of war, and to counterbalance American                                                         
28 The International Law Association, “Report of the Thirty-third Conference held at the Riddarhuset 
and at the Riksdaghuset, Stockholm, September 8–13, 1924”, The International Law Association 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 2 & 3 Chancery Lane, W.C.2., 1925), p. 75. 
29 Positive law (ius positum) was a European legal tradition of the mid–eighteenth to mid–twentieth 
centuries that upheld sovereign nation-states as both creators and enforcers of the law. See: Antony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
14 
hegemony following the induction of Wilsonian liberalism at the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919. In his eyes, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) founded by the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists at the Peace Palace of The Hague in 1920 had not 
accomplished these tasks. 
The PCIJ, also known as the new “World Court”, was a “scheme for preventing war” 
by settling disputes between governments.30 This Court was remarkably similar to its 
predecessor – the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was established at the 1899 Peace 
Conference of The Hague and sought to guarantee “perpetual peace” by negotiating 
settlements between nation-states.31 Although considered as early as 1907 during the Second 
Conference of The Hague, the PCIJ was not implemented at this time. This was due to an 
inability to elect judges – “to reduce forty-four to fifteen without excluding judges from some 
of the other states”.32 The Court was formally proposed in 1920 in accordance with Article 
fourteen of the Covenant of the League of Nations.33 At the Court’s official inauguration on 
16 June 1920, Leon Bourgeoisie announced on behalf of the League that the new Court was 
to be one of justice and not arbitration.34 Many contemporaries saw the PCIJ as a symbolic 
renewal of global order after the unsuccessful International Arbitration Court and 
International Prize Court of 1907, neither of which gained sufficient momentum and had 
patently failed to prevent the atrocities of the First World War.35 The rehabilitative spirit of 
                                                        
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 41–52. 
30 “League of Nations Elects Full Bench of World Court”, The New York Times, September 15, 1921; 
The International Law Association, “Report of the Thirty-third Conference”, p. 99. 
31 “International Arbitration”, Dundee Courier, 7 January, 1907, p. 4. 
32 James Brown Scott, An International Court of Justice: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Division of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), p. 38; See also, 
“World Court of Justice: Drafts Scheme Ready”, Aberdeen Journal, 27 July, 1920, p. 5. 
33 Advisory Committee of Jurists, “Draft–Scheme for the Institution of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice”, Advocate of Peace Through Justice, vol. 82, no. 9/10, (September–October, 
1920), pp. 303–307. 
34 “Jurists Begin Work on League’s Court”, The New York Times, 17 June, 1920; See also: “The 
world’s most significant document”, Advocate of Peace through Justice, vol. 82, no. 9, (September–
October 1920), p. 294; Baron Deschamps, “Address by Baron Deschamps”, Advocate of Peace through 
Justice, vol. 82, no. 9, (September–October 1920), pp. 307-308. 
35 Scott, An International Court of Justice, pp. 40–48; F. N. Keen, “The Duties of Nations”, 
Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 8, (1922), p. 57; E. A. Whittuck, “A Court of international 
Justice”, Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 5, (1919), p. 39. 
15 
the new Court led the New York Times to believe that the PCIJ would not survive without “the 
physical as well as the moral backing of the League of Nations”.36 
It was not until four years before his death, Bellot ultimately stood before the ILA at 
The Riddarhuset in Stockholm and presented the first statute for the ICC. “There is a 
considerable body of opinion behind it”, he claimed, “I have largely modelled my Statute 
upon that of the Permanent Court of Justice”.37 Hollis R Bailey observed, “he has made a new 
court of it.”38 Bellot assured his audience that the ICC served a “totally different purpose […] 
the administration of criminal law”.39 Criminal jurisdiction, however, did not adequately 
explain the ICC’s purpose because of two ambiguities that cannot be readily ignored. Firstly, 
even if Hannah Arendt argues that “the purpose of a trial is to render justice”,40 it is important 
to note that the PCIJ and the ICC were both in the interests of justice, and sought to prevent 
future conflicts. Secondly, Bellot conceded, “it is impossible to predict exactly what methods 
will be employed in future war, and therefore you cannot define them”.41 In response, the 
Honourable Charles H. Butler observed, “the laws of humanity and the dictates of public 
conscience are expressions too vague and indefinite to be the guide of any Court, no matter 
how constituted.”42 For Bellot, the laws of humanity were not grounded in a contemporary 
human rights discourse, but instead symbolised “the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations”,43 for which nearly a decade earlier, Andrew Pearce Higgins, a British 
lawyer and fellow colleague of The Grotius Society, had alleged were the “basis of all 
laws”.44 This chapter looks beyond the legal language of Bellot’s statute to instead ground his 
desires for the Court within context.   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Historical scholarship has not investigated why Bellot supported the creation of a 
Court as opposed to a Commission or a Committee. Neither has scholarship addressed or 
considered why the creation of an ICC was a matter of “urgency” despite the existence of the 
PCIJ. In a similar vein to Alfaro’s 1950 United Nations (UN) Report, historians Daniel 
Segesser and Myriam Gessler have read Bellot’s statute to be symptomatic of a broader 
teleological narrative of expanding international criminal law throughout the twentieth 
century.45 While acknowledging Bellot’s early contribution, they are nevertheless critical of 
his efforts, asserting that “Bellot […] had dominated the debate on the punishment of war 
crimes […] the lead passed on more and more to jurists with a legal background dominated 
by Roman law.”46 While seeking to dispel the traditional continuity in the ICC’s history 
through the lens of individual experience, one cannot overstate Bellot’s historical agency. In 
spite of the coincidental lapse in the ILA’s efforts to establish the Court following Bellot’s 
death, work was continued by the Interparliamentary Union, the International Congress of 
Penal Law, the Association International de Droit Penal and the Pan-American Union.47 
Segesser and Gessler avoided making definitive claims on Bellot’s impact upon the historic 
evolution of the Court. Their study does not explore the circumstances which led to the 
creation and rejection of Bellot’s original proposal at Stockholm. 
On the evening of 12 August 1928 Bellot passed away at the Hotel Europa in Warsaw 
while finalising his work on the thirty-forth conference of the ILA.48 To Bellot’s 
contemporaries, his allegiance to humanity transcended customary loyalties to the British 
Empire. Frank Savery, the British Consul-General in Poland, who on hearing the news put 
pen to paper, writing that Bellot had died “on the field of battle, fighting” for the “ideal of  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Internationalism through Law”.49 Savery’s tributary words evoked the merits of heroism, 
sacrifice, and piety, and subtly alluded to the tragic loss of Bellot’s son during the First World 
War.50 A poetic image of a father reunited with the ghost of his son upon the battlefield was a 
myth that saw Bellot’s devotion to international law pitted against the universal experience of 
human loss. An obituary writer for the ILA reflected that the British Foreign Office 
disallowed Bellot’s commendation of honours from a “Northern Monarch” for his 
“undoubtedly sound” advice to the Polish Government in regard to their disputes with 
Germany, and the Hungarian Government in their conflict with Romania, because such 
efforts did not acknowledge “services to the British Empire” but rather “services to 
humanity”.51 It is not probable that Bellot sought to establish an ICC for mere vocational 
reasons. During the War he was already a well-established Professor of Constitutional Law at 
the prestigious University College in London.52 Whether Bellot equated his own trauma to a 
universal experience, perhaps typified by his enthusiasm for an ICC, remains unexplored by 
contemporary scholars. 
Although international lawyers frequently employed anti-national rhetoric in the 
name of humanity and civilisation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
one cannot fail to recognise the sudden shift in Bellot’s focus after the death of his son. 
Following resignation from his professorship at University College in London, Bellot began 
publishing articles on the prevention and punishment of war crimes and was soon appointed 
to the War Crimes Committee by the British Attorney-General, Sir Frederick E. Smith.53 It 
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was at this point in time, that Bellot began specialising on the treatment of prisoners of war.54 
These efforts continued into 1915 when he became Honorary Secretary of The Grotius 
Society – an organisation that was inspired by the memory of Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth 
century natural law theorist who was widely credited with founding the law of nations.55 “The 
aim of the Society”, Bellot wrote, “is to promote impartial discussion on the Laws of War and 
Peace”.56 The following year, he accompanied the British lawyer, Lord Robert Phillimore as 
Co-Secretary of the ILA – an association which “emanated from America” and was founded 
in Brussels in 1873.57 Bellot soon became a focal member of an intellectual elite class of 
lawyers, whose “heroic work” transcended the vices of aggressive nationalism and acted as 
“the legal conscience of the civilised world”.58 Just as Bellot’s personal narrative was tied to a 
universal humanity and was used as a vehicle to justify the moral authority of international 
lawyers, so too had he harnessed the myths and memories of Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645), 
John Locke (1632 – 1704), John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1973) and Francis Lieber (1798 – 1872) 
to define the role of international courts in an Anglo-American civilisation. 
 The aftermath of the First World War provided fertile terrain for international 
lawyers to contemplate the invention of an ICC. In a neatly paradoxical sense, the initiation 
and forestalment of the ICC’s creation in the 1920s was symptomatic of an identity crisis 
within the international legal community. The role of international law in the scientific 
governance of the global community was re-evaluated when nineteenth century liberal 
distinctions between civilised European and uncivilised non-European communities were 
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pummelled by “the unlicensed barbarism of war”.59 While Hannah Arendt draws a 
relationship between the coincidental emergence of European liberalism and imperial 
expansionism, she also highlights the internal disintegration of the “European nation-state 
system” following the emergence of minority rights, refugee movements and various 
revolutions after the War.60 Furthermore, while Antony Anghie and Emanuelle Jouannet both 
interpret the Eurocentric nature of international law as the embodiment of imperial rule, 
Koskenemmi observes that international lawyers balanced “their moderate nationalism with 
their liberal internationalism.”61 He argues, “no stable standard of civilisation emerged to 
govern entry into the community of international law” in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.62 Just as the Allies had expelled Germany from the family of “civilised 
states” at Versailles in 1918, so too had Bellot denounced national courts as the legal basis of 
Anglo-American civilisation in Stockholm in 1924. For the British lawyer, Higgins, the 
“Westaphalian myth” of state sovereignty was no longer a sacrosanct principle, “the very 
foundations of the law of nations has been shaken by this civil war”, furthermore “there is 
much need for a Court in which the states of the world could place complete confidence”.63 
Bellot defended Higgins’ words while delivering a guest lecture at the University College 
London in 1921. He announced “without such a Court civilisation is in dire peril”.64 These 
opinions echoed across the Atlantic when two years later the American Senator, Thomas 
Marshall was cited in the Nottingham Evening Post, proposing that the “laws of every 
civilised people shall be so altered so as to provide that no war shall be fought until a  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referendum” is held.65 An ICC, he advocated, should try any violation of this referendum. Sir 
Graham Bower voiced his indifference to such opinions after hearing Bellot speak before the 
ILA in Stockholm: 
Our municipal courts, in my judgement, are the last defence of civilisation. 
An International Criminal Court […] should not be discussed in the present 
atmosphere.66 
Bower was a former wartime officer of the British Royal Navy, whose national patriotism had 
cemented his faith in the principle of absolute state sovereignty.67 He was not a lone voice in 
this regard. Writers of the Cork Examiner supported Bower’s position by protesting against 
the manner in which an ICC would supposedly deprive the “citizens of any one state […] of 
the right of being tried by their own countrymen”.68  
 Bellot did not stray from his course or capitulate to these criticisms. He had 
championed the cause of a resentful British press, whose faith in the ability of national courts 
to deliver justice was betrayed by the outcomes of the Leipzig Trials in 1921. At the German 
Reichsgericht in Leipzig, the British press had expected that German war criminals would be 
held accountable for the barbarism committed against their fellow countrymen held as 
prisoners during the First World War. The Times wrote that justice had not been served at 
Leipzig “because the impartiality of the Bench was not directly called into question”.69 
Indignant journalists for the Dundee Courier concurred by protesting that the trials “were a 
derision of justice” for “out of sixteen prisoners put forward by the Allies only six were 
convicted”.70 The German Gazette in contrast voiced the views of “many Germans” who 
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found “the sentence too hard”.71 The British Western Daily Press believed these sentiments 
revealed the alien and uncivilised “mentality of the German military system”.72  
 One must note an important distinction between Bellot’s universal critique against 
absolute state sovereignty and the conviction of British mass politics to stigmatise the 
German nation. While Bellot wrote that “the Prussian theory of war”, which advocated a 
principle of “military necessity […] cannot be tolerated by the civilised world”, he argued 
that “selfish nationalism” caused “international chaos” and obstructed the impartial delivery 
of justice in times of peace.73 From these sources alone, it cannot be conclusively determined 
whether Bellot aimed to mask a personal vendetta against Germany behind an anti-national 
guise of intellectual reason, or whether Leipzig merely provided ammunition for his 
preconceived criticism against state-centred positive law. His broader academic critique 
against statehood did nonetheless distinguish his own voice from the emotionally charged and 
unruly appearance of mob justice. In doing so, it anticipated the doubts raised by James Leslie 
Brierly, a Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford, who claimed that an ICC 
would attract “martyrdom to the compelling sense of patriotic duty”.74 From this point, one 
may deduce Bellot’s intention was to avoid delivering “victors’ justice” which had been the 
expectation of an ICC following the British public’s response of casting themselves as 
martyrs to the judgements of the Leipzig Trials. The impartial and immutable word of the law 
was both integral to his liberal vision of Anglo-American civilisation and an invaluable 
symbolic foundation upon which to generate widespread support for the creation of an ICC. 
The depersonalised legal phraseology of Bellot’s statute may be read as a continued and 
beckoned call for international law to transcend the fog of national politics. Therefore, whilst 
an international tribunal was not considered a novel concept by 1924, Bellot recognised the 
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challenge when three years earlier he had quoted the nineteenth century American Chief 
Justice, Marshall, who declared that “no political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of 
breaking down the lines, which separate the States” with the rule of an International Criminal 
Court.75 Bellot thus included in his statute the key phrase, “the Court shall be open to the 
subjects or citizens of every State”.76 
 Bellot’s intentions to depoliticise the Court were resonant with the form of his 
statute. His decisions to emphasise the laws of humanity, to declare English and French as the 
official languages of the Court, and to frame Articles eighteen, nineteen and twenty-five 
within a humanitarian branch of law marked a significant departure from the PCIJ and 
signified a degree of latitude in his role as the sole drafter.77 In addition, these factors 
demonstrated Bellot’s goal to humanise the laws of war, as several years earlier he avowed, 
“war should be conducted between combatants with humanity”.78 He referred to the rules of 
war established by the ancient Greeks and Romans in order to provide his humanitarian ideals 
with a firm historical resonance.79 Bellot revealed a leaning towards an historical method of 
thought during his early legal career when he published the well-renowned history on The 
Inner and Middle Temple: Legal, Literary and Historic Associations (1902).80 In later years, 
he expressed a debt to the German born, liberal American nationalist François Lieber, who 
had written the American war book Instructions (1881) in conjunction with American 
wartime officers.81 Bellot wrote, “Lieber’s Instructions also formed the basis for those laws of 
war on land contained in Conventions II and IV of the Hague Peace Conferences 1899 and  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1907”, and furthermore, “they guided the principles of justice, honour and humanity” – an 
impartial justice which transcended nationalism.82 Bellot’s reverence for Lieber’s 
humanitarian wisdom did not signify, nor can be mistaken for a praise of American political 
culture. Bernard E. Brown reminds us that Lieber’s humanitarian character marked the limits 
of his nationalism, which showed signs of a greater loyalty to liberal internationalism.83 In 
1847, Lieber had cautioned against aggressive expansionism in America by recounting 
memories of the Thirty Years War, and Prussia’s “wavering inconsistency between the 
requirements of civilisation and a police government, keeping the noble land for centuries 
from her destiny”.84 He was strongly opposed to the expansion of American slaveholders in 
the South and lost his son in the civil war – a loss Bellot would have empathised with. “As 
civilisation has advanced”, Lieber wrote in his Instructions, “private citizens are no longer 
murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts”.85 
 Bellot expressed this ideology in Stockholm by drawing a clear distinction between 
“a belligerent and a neutral”.86 He had previously criticised the Prussian theory of war that 
upheld the principle of absolute state sovereignty, while simultaneously blurring the 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant. This was evident in the ambiguous legal 
phraseology of the German war book Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (1902): 
According to the notions of the laws of war today the following persons are to be 
treated as prisoners of war […] all civilians staying with the army […] all persons 
actively concerned with the war […] prisoners of war are subject to the laws of the 
State which has captured them.87 
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Bellot was vitriolic in his assault upon these German laws when he stood before The Grotius 
Society on 21 March 1921, making particular reference to the “Fryatt case”.88 Nearly six 
years earlier, Charles Fryatt, Captain of an unarmed British merchant vessel attempted to 
resist capture from an enemy by ramming a German submarine. Journalists for the Evening 
Telegraph recalled the “Anglo-American view” in which “a merchant ship […] is allowed to 
resist capture from an enemy of war”.89 Contrary to this view, Fryatt was tried at the German 
municipal Court in Bruges and executed on the basis that his actions were unlawful. For 
Bellot, the Fryatt and Leipzig cases revealed the incompetence of national courts and the 
archaic personality of German law. They symbolised the barbarism “we had thought had been 
left behind with the Thirty Years War of the 17th century”, and as such, they had no place in 
the Anglo-American civilisation that Bellot sought to defend in his statute of the ICC.90 Bellot 
was opposed to the opinion of Reverend T.J. Lawrence, a member of The Grotius Society, 
who had posited that modern developments such as national conscription have “put in 
jeopardy the time honoured distinction” between belligerents and neutrals.91 Instead, Bellot 
rested his case on the authority of the eminent American international lawyer, James Brown 
Scott, who believed that “the execution of Captain Fryatt appears to have been without 
warrant in international law”.92 
 America’s place within Bellot’s idea of civilisation requires further clarification. He 
did not share the opinion of his one surviving son Hugh Hale Bellot (1890 – 1969), who was 
a Commonwealth Fund Professor of American History at the University of London.93 In 
1955, Hugh Bellot praised the former American President Woodrow Wilson as “a politician 
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among scholars”, who “remains to this day an extremely stimulating person”.94 Bellot, the 
elder, did not subscribe to the dogma of the late nineteenth century that “through America, 
England is being exposed to the world”.95 As Mark Mazower has stated, the United States 
joined the Allies in 1917 and in consequence became commonly recognised as a European 
power, “if not its first rank”.96 Various international peace organisations drew upon “invented 
traditions” by harnessing the minds of select individuals to identify their American origins. 
The ILA for instance, claimed inspiration from the American “learned blacksmith” and 
diplomat, Elihu Burrett.97 Even if Bellot was a key figure of the ILA and revered the work of 
American philanthropist and international peace-worker, Andrew Carnegie (1835 – 1919),98 
he did not idolise America nor did he entirely endorse Carnegie’s attitude that the cooperation 
between nation-states and “the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration […] is the 
most important step forward of a worldwide humanitarian character”.99  
 When examining the role of the United States in leading Anglo-American 
civilisation towards perpetual peace, Bellot turned to the origins of the Supreme Court, which 
he claimed was the inspiration for the PCIJ. He contradicted the American historian, Henry 
Maine, who believed the Supreme Court was “a virtually unique creation” of the United 
States Constitution.100 Bellot argued that John Locke’s (1632 – 1704) separation of the 
authority of the judiciary, executive and legislative in his Second Treatise of Government 
(1690) had provided a blueprint for each of these Courts, and thereby recognised their English  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origins.101 He told his students in London “this doctrine crossed the Atlantic to persuade the 
framers of the [US] Constitution that only the complete separation of powers can prevent the 
approach of tyranny”.102 Bellot’s emphasis on Locke’s contribution to international law may 
be read as both a criticism of American supremacy within the global context and an assault 
upon positivism. While Bellot was not himself a theorist of natural law, he did support 
Locke’s understanding of man’s liberty from “absolute arbitrary power”.103 These were the 
ideas that had motivated Bellot to cite the English academic Professor Pollard, who stated 
there must be “antagonism between the interests […] of the Government and the governed. 
No one could really be trusted with the exercise of sovereign power”.104 
 Bellot was set apart from Carnegie by his attachment to the Victorian ideals of 
social progress. These principles were fostered by his father, William Henry Bellot, who had 
sent him to study at Leamington College in Oxford and Trinity College in Cambridge.105 It 
was in this intellectual and upper-middle class milieu where Bellot was exposed to the 
political philosophies of the English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873). Bellot’s 
writings showed a conscious recognition of Mill when citing his 1861 words, that “the 
Supreme Court […] is one of the most prominent wants of civilised society”.106 His influence 
was noted more subtly when Bellot wrote, “a violation of international law is not yet regarded 
as a crime to be prevented and punished unless it is of those members of the family of nations 
who are directly affected”.107 These words resonated with Mill’s observation that “one of the 
effects of civilisation is, that the spectacle […] of pain, is kept more and more out of sight of 
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those classes who enjoy in their fullness the benefits of civilisation”.108 Mill believed it was 
the duty of those classes who were “in advance of society” to maintain and evaluate the laws 
of a community109 – a reflection of Bellot’s choice to distinguish himself from the unruly 
crowd of mass politics at the time of the Leipzig Trials. Furthermore, Mill wrote in his essay 
Civilisation (1836) that “perfect co-operation, is an attribute of civilisation”.110 As a result of 
his father’s political teachings, Mill emphasised a utilitarian view of cooperation. In civilised 
society, he believed, “power passes more and more from individuals […] to masses”.111 
Individual liberty was favoured until it threatened the welfare of society.  
 According to Mazower and Jouannet, Mill drew vivid distinctions between 
European and non-European societies, “with the former civilising the latter”.112 Bellot’s 
ideologies cannot be detached entirely from his late nineteenth century roots, nor can one 
overstate his admiration for Mill as a clear indicator of his own imperialist mindset. The 
historical record notes only two direct moments of Bellot’s imperial tendencies. In 1927, he 
wrote a letter to The Times stating “the abandonment by the Crown of its territorial 
jurisdiction […] may seriously jeopardise imperial interests.”113 In earlier years he voiced the 
opinion before The Grotius Society that “some States had little idea of law and order”, and 
furthermore, “it would be advantageous if the Constitutions of some other countries could be 
framed more on Anglo-American lines.”114 Even if Mill had written his essay on civilisation 
in a decade when “history and progress” were “unremitting preoccupations of nineteenth 
century British Liberalism”,115 the preservation of Empire was not Bellot’s primary intention 
at Stockholm, for his Anglo-American values were chiefly directed towards “civilised states”,  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with the ultimate goal of taming their competing demands for sovereignty above the rule of 
international law.  
 Mill’s utilitarianism structured Bellot’s understanding of the rights and duties of 
civilised nations. For him, the relationship between the individual and the masses paralleled 
that of the state and the global community. His interpretation of Hugo Grotius’s “family of 
nations” was essentially utilitarian. It was for this reason, he wrote: 
The Americans, just as they have established equality before the law for 
individuals within the State, so they have established equality before the 
law for the States of the Union.116 
Bellot did not maintain Carnegie’s enthusiasm for national self-interest when conceptualising 
the law of nations. In 1917, Bellot suggested that The Grotius Society, the American Institute 
of International Law, the American Society of International Law and the Institut de Droit 
International should convene and propose a list of war crimes that would be codified into 
international law by the Allied and neutral powers – a proposal he conjectured, in which 
“state interests will take second place”.117 This was the spirit of impartiality in which Bellot 
conceived his statute for the ICC. 
 Bellot’s utilitarian conception of the Grotian tradition did not support the ideals of 
Wilsonian liberalism. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, President Woodrow Wilson 
proposed a fourteen-point plan in which national self-determination would ensure the 
collective security of Anglo-American civilisation.118 Self-determinism was a grounding 
concept for minority rights.119 They were not an individual, but rather a group concept. Erez 
Manuela has argued that Wilson did not use self-determinism to ensure the racial equality and 
sovereignty of China within the global community. Jay Winter and Mark Mazower have each 
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extrapolated on this idea by positing that the League of Nations perpetuated an imperial goal 
to establish legal hegemony across Europe and maintain the sovereignty of nation-states.120 
Mazower has made particular reference to Wilson’s adoption of the nationalist ideals 
presented by the Italian political activist Giuseppe Mazzini (1805 – 1872), whose vision of an 
international society of sovereign nation-states had underpinned the values set forth at the 
Concert of Europe in 1815, following the defeat of Napoleon – “Woodrow Wilson 
appreciated” that “Mazzini was among the first […] to think seriously about international 
cooperation in terms of politics and nationalism”.121 In 1920, Lord Shaw, a member of The 
Grotius Society, recalled the speech delivered by Wilson in Congress on 22 January 1917, 
“there must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power, not organised rivalries, 
but an organised common peace”.122 In a somewhat sceptical tone Lord Shaw concluded by 
questioning, “what, then, was the ambit of this community of power, this common peace?”123 
Bellot directly criticised self-determinism as an aspect of American self-interest when he 
proclaimed that a country embedded in “the political theory of exclusive self-interest or 
selfish nationalism, can never become a member of the family of nations”.124 For this reason, 
he blamed Wilson for the loss of the British ocean liner Lusitania, which was sunk by a 
German submarine in 1915.125 He believed such a catastrophe might have been averted had 
Wilson “denounced German submarine warfare, not because it infringed American rights of 
property and privileges of commerce, but because it violated the rights of all neutrals”.126 
 It was from this political and intellectual context that Bellot came to detest the PCIJ, 
which safeguarded the interests of the Great Powers. For Bellot, it symbolised anti-progress. 
“This Court”, Bellot wrote, “has occupied rather the position of a standing Commission of 
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distinguished diplomats”.127 The Court, therefore, did not uphold “the main forms of 
civilisation” because it was not consistent with his depoliticised Anglo-American vision of 
“liberty regulated by law”.128  
 Bellot, a pragmatist understood his statute would be shelved if he did not honour the 
PCIJ. The United States would not allow a Court “of which she has played a great part” and 
“which constitutes a living expression of her own ideals” to perish.129 Lord Phillimore, the 
British delegate on the Advisory Committee of Jurists, confessed that he and the American 
representative, Elihu Root both “felt that any elimination of any of the larger nations would 
weaken the Court”.130 Phillimore and Root each held a significant authorial power over the 
final draft of the statute. In spite of the symbolic value of the “Root-Phillimore plan” as a 
joint Anglo-American agreement, the writers of The Advocate for Peace Through Justice 
promoted the PCIJ as an “American project” that represented “the most notable and 
significant document before the world today”, and one that would allow “passionless 
decisions” to be made “irrespective of political policy”.131 Bellot’s anti-national rhetoric was 
taken beyond his original intentions and was employed to secure global consent for the 
creation of the PCIJ, which did not threaten the sovereignty of the Wilson administration. 
 The overarching grandeur of the PCIJ, coupled with the widespread approval it had 
received from the international community was made visible at the Vienna Conference of the 
ILA in 1926. Bellot’s original plan for an ICC was buried beneath a plethora of ideas and 
suggested amendments that were proposed by various members of the conference. On the 
morning of 9 August, Judge Caloyanni, the Chairmen of the Conference, made the ruinous 
observation that “no less than three-quarters” of the revised statute “correspond with, and 
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very often are word for word taken from, the statute of the now existing Permanent Court”.132 
One year hence, Brierly concluded in his paper for the British Journal of International Law, 
“we need no new court for this purpose”.133 The underlying interest in the preservation of 
civilisation had distorted the lines of legal jurisdiction between these two courts. In this 
regard, Bellot was ambitious in being the first to articulate his own dream in writing, but his 
implementation was not strategic. His statute inevitably yielded to the politics of consent and 
was deemed second in authority to the broader opinions of the ILA. 
 In this chapter, Bellot’s liberal vision of Anglo-American civilisation was used as an 
lens to survey new historical interpretations of the ICC’s purpose in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. To identify the historical intentions that motivated the initial stages of the 
Court’s development, one must look beyond the limits of jurisdiction and the constitutional 
history of criminal law. Its official “criminal” status was only a formal signature used to 
differentiate the Court from various international tribunals of the period. The Court’s 
distinctive purpose was indeed subtler, and was strategically hidden beneath the legal 
phraseology of Bellot’s statute. While Bellot was often a lone voice that did not represent the 
universal opinion of his age, these circumstances were in fact instrumental in our 
understanding of why the ICC did not significantly progress beyond the preliminary stages of 
the Stockholm Conference. Its ideological mission did not possess one single origin. The 
Court was not only a response to the perceived atrocities of German barbarism, but it was also 
a reaction to the ineptitude of national courts and the Wilson administration’s post-war 
strategy to secure an American hegemony within the global community. An understanding of 
Bellot’s perspective dissuades against holistic assumptions that the ICC was both a paragon 
of imperial rule and the natural progeny of the PCIJ. For Bellot, the ICC was not so much an 
“organ” of the PCIJ, as it was its alter ego. 
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Chapter Two 
 
A Discourse on Human Rights: 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and the Nuremberg Myth 
 
  
 
An International Criminal Court […] has not yet received the serious consideration which it merits […] 
the idea of an international criminal court is much wider than the punishment of war crimes. It vitally 
affects the problem of individual responsibility for criminal violations of international law. There 
cannot be much hope for international law or morality if the individual acting as the organ of the State 
can […] screen himself effectively behind the impersonal, metaphysical State. – Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht at The Hague Academy of International Law, 1937.134 
 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. The first is to examine Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht’s (1897 – 1960) universal vision of individual human rights as a perspective to 
explore the newly discovered purpose of the ICC in the mid-twentieth century. In this period 
the Court became an evolving institutional expression of rights, and the language of 
civilisation no longer fuelled the moral engine of international law.135 The second aim of the 
chapter is to contrast the political cultures of international law between the 1920s and the 
1950s by revisiting the contentious relationship between the ICC and the PCIJ, which on 18 
April 1946 had become a judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) and evolved into the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). I will revisit the relationship between the ICC’s “invented 
traditions” and the growth of international politics by drawing particular reference to the 
Nuremberg Trial as a foundation myth of the Court. The hollow rhetoric of the “human rights 
revolution”, coupled with Lauterpacht’s loss of faith in the effectiveness of international  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courts during his latter years will be a yardstick for measuring why the Nuremberg myth was 
an unstable basis upon which to build international support for the creation of an ICC at the 
time. 
The Austrian born international lawyer, Lauterpacht was a humanist, a scholar and a 
judge. Three years after tragically losing his family to the Nazis, Lauterpacht was called on to 
play a significant role at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (1945 – 1946), 
advising and drafting speeches for the American and British chief prosecutors, Sir Robert 
Jackson and Sir Hartley Shawcross.136 Lauterpacht shared Bellot’s objection to the “positive 
doctrine” of absolute state sovereignty though he distanced himself from the civilisation 
discourse to instead promote individual human rights as the linchpin of international law – a 
principle that anchored the notions of “individual criminal responsibility” and “crimes against 
humanity” in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgements.137 One year prior to the Nuremberg 
Trial, Lauterpacht’s former mentor at Cambridge, Hans Kelsen (1881 – 1973), had claimed 
that the purpose of penalising individuals “should be to stigmatise guilty persons morally and 
politically” in order to avoid the persecution of an entire nation, thereby offering Germany the 
chance to reintegrate into the European community.138 The extent to which Lauterpacht’s 
involvement in Nuremberg had influenced his perceptions of the ICC’s historical foundation, 
purpose and legitimacy have received little attention by contemporary historians. For 
Lauterpacht and Bellot, the purposes of an ICC and international law were entwined. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, Lauterpacht sought to promote Nuremberg as the backbone of 
international law for it had gathered the spiritual power of collective experience following the 
trauma of the Second World War, and furthermore, the trial aided his own self-identification,  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when the concept of the individual as the basis of international law was a fashionable belief 
among his British colleagues during the interwar period. Koskenniemi notes that 
Lauterpacht’s “early self-positioning in Britain” was an “assimilative strategy”.139 
 Historians have not considered why the Nuremberg myth did not generate sufficient 
momentum for the creation of an ICC during the 1950s, when a number of delegates from the 
Rome Conference in 1998 and legal scholars subsequently regarded the prosecution of war 
criminals at the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg to be either foundational or the 
key turning point in the ICC’s history.140 Lawrence J. LeBlanc frames the ICC’s origins 
within the work of the Genocide Convention held in Geneva in 1948, which aimed to 
strengthen the groundwork established in Nuremberg two years earlier.141 On 9 December 
1948 at the Geneva Convention, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) invited 
the International Law Commission (ILC) “to study the possibility of establishing a criminal 
chamber of the International Court of Justice”.142 The following day a journalist for The 
Times observed, “this new measure clearly has connexion with the Nuremberg judgement”.143 
Lauterpacht did not so much establish the Nuremberg myth as he did perpetuate it. “The 
stature of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgement will grow with the passage of years”, 
Lauterpacht announced, “as a vital event in the maintenance of the authority of the very 
preservation of international law”.144 Before a lecture hall of students at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem on 7 May 1950, he extolled the virtues of the Nuremberg Charter for                                                         
139 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 373–374. 
140 Henkin, “Human Rights: Ideology and Inspiration, Reality and Prospect”, p. 9; Zappalà, Human 
Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 8; Schabas, 
An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
pp. 38–54; LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention, pp. 151–174; Stevenson and 
Ratner, “The Genocide Convention after Fifty Years”, pp. 1–19; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, 
“United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court: Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records”, vol. 2. Summary records of the 
plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole (New York: United Nations, 
2002), p. 155. 
141 LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention, pp. 151–174. 
142 LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention, p. 159. 
143 “Genocide Declared A Crime”, The Times, 10 December, 1948, p. 3. 
144 For a verbatim record of the lecture that Lauterpacht delivered at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem on 7 May 1950, see: “International Law After the Second World War”, in Hersch 
Lauterpacht, International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, eds., Eli 
Lauterpacht, vol. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 165. 
35 
pronouncing the inalienable and superior human rights of individuals and responsibilities 
above the law of sovereign nation-states. “The Judgement which is based on them, will 
continue to be a source of controversy”, he advised, “unless the principal Powers who framed 
them […] accept them as law”.145  
Two months after Lauterpacht’s address in Jerusalem, the ILC presented two reports 
on the possibility and desirability of creating an ICC. In the judgement of Ricardo Alfaro, 
both the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo “did actually function and 
fulfil their mission”, and as a result, “their texts show that the constitution of an international 
court is possible and feasible”.146 In contrast, the report by Emil Sandström did not strongly 
endorse either Nuremberg or Tokyo as founding precedents upon which to form an ICC.147 
While Sandström recommended the Court should be a principle organ of the UN, paralleling 
the International Court of Justice, he concluded that state sovereignty would be too great an 
obstacle to overcome, due to the necessity to amend the UN Charter.148 Czechoslovakia, 
Byelorussian SSR, Poland, and the Soviet Union protested against the ICC on grounds of 
state sovereignty, while Australia, Brazil, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom each upheld and shared the view that the Court was an impractical endeavour.149 
They concluded that individuals were not the perpetrators of international crimes. An air of 
cynicism pervaded the United States Senate Congress. Many delegates interpreted Alfaro and 
Sandström’s reports as possessing only “symbolic value”, as opposed to offering a genuine 
contribution towards the establishment of an ICC.150 Writers for The Grotius Society were 
similarly sceptical of Alfaro’s “exaggerated” claim that “the public opinion of the world has 
been clamouring for the establishment […] of an international jurisdiction competent to deal  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with international crimes”.151 The British Attorney-General and a chief prosecutor in 
Nuremberg, Sir Hartley Shawcross cautioned against any effort that would “undermine the 
principles of individual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity and for war 
crimes which we had succeeded in laying down”.152 It was not to be until seven years later 
that the General Assembly finally “decided to postpone the consideration” of an ICC until the 
draft code of “Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind” was completed.153 This 
resulted in the Netherlands representative at the UN condemning the decision as “an act of 
treason against the principles established” in Nuremberg and Tokyo.154 Historical scholarship 
has not investigated why the UN’s efforts to establish an ICC were dropped in 1957, and 
more specifically, why nations were inclined to dismiss the ICC as an unrealistic project, nor 
why the proposal of an ICC was resurrected in the mid-twentieth century when “the 
International Court of Justice was at the time regarded as the most important international 
tribunal in the world” and “had no competitor”.155 Wolfgang Freidman, author for the 
Virginia Law Review wrote: 
The creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice […] and its 
continuation under the United Nations Charter under the International 
Court of Justice […] led many advocates to place great hopes in this new 
juridical international institution.156 
 
Just as Bellot’s liberal vision of Anglo-America was challenged at the Stockholm 
Conference, so too was Lauterpacht’s faith in Nuremberg as a foundation myth for the ICC. 
On 3 August 1951 The Times wrote, “the Nuremberg tribunal could not be regarded as a 
precedent” for “if the court were set up and could not function effectively it would merely 
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become an object of contempt”.157 The British Attorney-General in 1951, Sir Frank Soskice 
noted that “the practical difficulties of setting up an international criminal court would be 
overwhelming” because “the accused might be persons with big followings in their own 
countries”.158 Nearly a decade earlier, Dr. Ernst Cohn stood before The Grotius Society and 
proclaimed “the task set before this Court is too great” and “by trying an impossible task the 
law exposes itself to ridicule”.159 He spoke in regard to the recent conference held in London 
at the Palace of St James, which planned a declaration for the ICC.160 The Grotius Society 
recognised the St James Conference as yet another number to add to the talks of past failures 
to establish an ICC for “this declaration of intention was not signed by the greatest 
Powers”.161 The declaration of the 1937 St James Conference held only nine signatures from 
representatives, whose countries were occupied by German forces. It amounted to merely a 
slip of paper in the wind of realpolitik.  
The initiation and forestalment of the ICC’s creation in the mid-twentieth century was 
once more symptomatic of an identity crisis within the international legal community. In 
contrast to Bellot’s era, the ICC’s legitimacy and vitality during the 1950s were hinged upon 
debates on the subjects of international law – debates that emerged simultaneously with the 
birth of the global human rights movement after the Second World War. New horizons in the 
international legal profession unveiled new limitations, triggering discussions on the overall 
effectiveness of international courts to reignite. While the International Court of Justice 
concerned international public law between states, and not international private law between 
individuals, its early performance was nevertheless an alternate political battleground for 
deciding the relevance of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals as founding precedents upon 
which to model an ICC. In 1959, Friedman noted, “the International Court of Justice […] is a 
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far weaker institution […] the shadow of national sovereignty constantly looms over the 
Court”.162 As will be discussed later, numerous cases in the ICJ archives have revealed the 
widespread dissatisfaction and doubt of nation-states with the absolute impartiality of the 
Court. As a result, the British Government withdrew its support for the ICJ in 1957 - 
coincidently the same year in which resentful British delegates at the UN had pronounced, 
“no useful purpose will be served by setting up such an International Penal Tribunal unless it 
can function effectively”.163 While many had recognised the PCIJ as a superior entity to the 
ICC during the early 1920s, the ICJ’s inability to overrule sovereign states was soon 
recognised as a dark sign that foreshadowed the ICC’s unrealistic ambition to enforce 
individual rights and responsibilities. The differences between these two courts had markedly 
changed. The ICJ had become a negative mirror image of the ICC. Lauterpacht himself had 
written in 1945 that the ICJ was successful “not so much on account of its actual 
achievements as an agency for settling controversies endangering the peace of the world, as in 
the revelation of its potentialities”.164 On account of the ICJ’s exclusive symbolic value, 
Friedman concluded in 1962 “a draft Convention establishing an International Criminal Court 
has no prospect of adoption”.165 
Realpolitik intensified in the mid-twentieth century, in part due to the League of 
Nations’ failure to prevent the Second World War. As Jouannet has argued: 
The inter-state classical liberal conception was the one that continued to be the rule 
in actual practice, while the concept of international human rights remained purely 
doctrinal with no effective consequence before 1945.166 
For Lauterpacht, the “growing conviction in the reality of power in international relations and 
diminishing faith in the reality of law” was indicative of the lawlessness exhibited during the  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World Wars, the inevitable paradox of “victors justice”, and the unrealistic ideal of impartial 
law as an organisational tool for all of “mankind”.167 Mazower notes the manner in which the 
Nazis and Fascists abused the minority rights regime and undermined the League of Nations 
during the interwar period by harnessing these terms to advance their own causes.168 He 
describes the “human rights revolution” during the mid-twentieth century as a “strange 
triumph” in which “a weaker international organisation was probably the price necessary for 
United States and Soviet participation” in the United Nations.169 Jouannet points to the twin 
phraseologies of the United Nations Charter that opens by stating, “we the peoples of the 
United Nations”, while the United States Constitution declares, “we the peoples of the United 
States”.170 Moyn, in citing Lauterpacht’s contemporary Professor H.A. Smith, notes that 
Grotius was not widely considered to be the founding father of international law in the mid-
twentieth century, and furthermore, “individual rights […] were being marginalised by the 
United Nations Charter, not advanced by it”.171 In 1950, Lauterpacht wrote, “international law 
does not at present recognise […] the rights of the individual” as “they are not fully 
enforceable”.172 It was the “crucial question of implementation” he had raised two years 
earlier at the Brussels Conference of the ILA, the same year in which The Times had voiced 
the British Government’s understanding that violations of international law are “essentially a 
crime committed by the States” and not by individuals.173 While human rights were a new 
machination of anti-political post-war rhetoric wherein “individuals on the fringes of political 
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life had significant agency”, they did not succeed in becoming an enforceable legal concept 
during Lauterpacht’s era.174  
 Lauterpacht’s tendency was to distance himself from the idiom of civilisation. As 
Mazower has stated, “the UN quickly banished what was left of the old imperial vocabulary 
of international civilisation”.175 In 1939 Georg Schwarzenberger, a fellow contemporary of 
Lauterpacht and writer for The Grotius Society, remarked on the comments of H.A. Smith, 
who had stated in a London radio broadcast the previous year: 
Conduct which in the nineteenth century would have placed a government outside 
the pale of civilized society is now deemed to be no obstacle to diplomatic 
friendship. This means, in effect, that we have abandoned the old distinction 
between civilized and uncivilized States.176 
 
In 1960, Clarence W. Jenks published an extensive tribute to Lauterpacht’s life and legal 
career. He affirmed that Lauterpacht’s supreme legacy to international law was a “firm bridge 
between British and Continental thinking”.177 While realist historiography may guard against 
definitive statements of Lauterpacht’s direct influence upon the evolution of international 
legal thought, he nonetheless symbolised a dramatic shift from the international political 
culture of Bellot’s generation. During Lauterpacht’s time at the London School of Economics 
(1923 – 1937), he wrote “The So-called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought 
in International Law” (1931) under the supervision of Dr. Arnold McNair. He criticised “the 
alleged contrast between Anglo-American and Continental schools of thought in international 
law”.178 For him, such a distinction found “no support either in the existing rules of 
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international law, or in the practice of international tribunals”.179 He continued by arguing that 
the “abandonment of this deeply rooted belief is desirable” for reasons of both “scientific 
accuracy” and the preservation of a “humanitarian point of view” in the international legal 
profession.180 Contrary to the accepted wisdom of his day, Lauterpacht pointed to the 
humanitarian doctrine of Hugo Grotius as a “universal moral code” which “whether in its 
traditional or modern garb” had anchored international law.181 In this respect, Lauterpacht 
believed “the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations” were a “safety valve” 
rather than a legitimate “source” of international law.182 According to Koskenniemi, 
Lauterpacht, who was originally educated in Vienna and sought to immerse himself within 
the intellectual elite of British society, rejected the civilisation “gap”.183 For Lauterpacht, the 
ICC was not vested in the interests of Anglo-American civilisation. Human rights were to be 
the new maxim of a Grotian morality in international law. 
Lauterpacht’s “individualism” was a significant departure from Bellot’s utilitarian 
view of the Grotian tradition.184 Unlike Bellot, Lauterpacht used Grotius’s Mare Liberum 
(1609) to argue, “the individual is the ultimate unit of all law”.185 He did not articulate 
Grotius’ legacy to be the humanisation of war with “respect for the better instincts of civilised 
nations”. While Bellot had claimed in 1916 that “atrocity crimes have been the cause of 
individual aggressors”, he maintained that such cases were “rare in history”.186 Just as 
members of The Grotius Society had argued in 1920that the League of Nations originated 
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from Grotius’ legal philosophy, so too had Lauterpacht remoulded the past by promoting 
Mare Liberum as the ideological foundation of both the United Nations and the concept of the 
individual as the basis of international law, which underpinned the Nuremberg Charter and 
Judgements.187 Whilst he employed Grotius’ words to provide individual human rights with 
an ancient resonance as testament to their universal authority, he also claimed that such an 
ideology would have been deemed “revolutionary” in the 1920s.188 In this respect, 
Lauterpacht was conscious of his manipulation of history. He was aware that the individual, 
as a fundamental component of international law, was by no means a universal truth. 
Lauterpacht harnessed Grotius’ works to illustrate that individual human rights were not an 
invented tradition, to instead recognise their universality and show that they endured the test 
of time. “The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has never become a fully acknowledged 
part of positive international law”, he proclaimed, “it was one of the factors which paved the 
way for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to fundamental human 
rights.”189 As such, Lauterpacht advocated the universal protection of individual human rights 
when delivering his 1950 lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem by harnessing the 
power of collective experience, “the murder of six million Jewish inhabitants of the occupied 
territories was in its essence, in its inception, and in the cruelty and magnitude of its 
execution, a crime against humanity”.190 He later acknowledged that “no international 
tribunal” was equipped to defend such rights.191 Coincidently, T.B. Murray of The Grotius 
Society proposed in the same year that an ICC would be “the most effective protection of 
those rights”.192 
It is evident that Lauterpacht’s distortions of the past were as fluid as his 
interpretations of language. For him, the individual human being as the base unit of 
                                                        
187 Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law”, p. 27; See also, Lauterpacht, See also, 
“The Subjects of International Law”, p. 33. 
188 Lauterpacht, “International Law After the Second World War”, p. 164. 
189 Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law”, p. 46. 
190 Lauterpacht, “International Law After the Second World War”, p. 161. 
191 Lauterpacht, “The Subjects of International Law”, p. 35. 
192 Murray, “The Present Position of International Criminal Justice”, p. 207. 
43 
international law was neatly captured in the line “populi respectu generis humani privatorum 
locum obstinent” of Mare Liberum.193 His analysis was centred upon the word privatorum, 
derived from the Latin stem prïvatus, which has no direct translation into English. Charles T. 
Lewis draws several meanings from this term, taken from readings of the classical scholars 
Cornelius Tacitus, Julius Caesar, Marvus Livius and Horatius Flaccus.194 His translations take 
the form of various expressions including: “a private citizen, withdrawn from state affairs, not 
in official life, private property, out of office, retired, private use” or “apart from the 
public”.195 Furthermore, it is logical that Lauterpacht used Ralph V.D. MaGoffin’s translation 
of privatorum published in 1916 at the Division of Law of the Carnegie Peace Endowment to 
mean “individual” because following the Carnegie Endowment for Peace’s invitation to 
Lauterpacht to lecture at several law schools in the United States in July 1940. While 
Lauterpacht used language strategically, which may be construed as an act of myth 
construction, his passion for international private law was also indicative of the individualism 
expressed in the mid-twentieth century human rights movement.  
When analysing Lauterpacht’s rationale it is important to recognise that his 
individualism predated the 1940s. Nuremberg offered Lauterpacht the opportunity to 
disseminate his pre-existing ideology throughout the global community. In The Life of Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht (2010), his son Elihu makes particular note that: 
The position of the individual in international law was long a matter of major concern 
for Hersch. From his earliest days of his research in Vienna, he rejected the view that 
States alone are the subjects of international law.196 
Just as Bellot may have equated his own trauma to a universal humanity, so too has Vrdoljak 
subscribed to the romantic narrative that recognises Lauterpacht’s European experiences of  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anti-Semitism and Zionism in Galicia as deciding factors in his commitment toward 
international law.197 From this point of view, one may believe Lauterpacht’s motivation to 
become a lawyer was exposed, when he claimed that the punishment of war crimes involves 
the “inherently reprehensible desire for retribution […] containing hitherto ruthlessly 
suppressed craving for revenge within the channels of a regularised legal procedure”.198 
Koskeniemi, however, was less emphatic on this point. He conceded that Lauterpacht’s 
professional literature revealed minimal evidence of his Zionist tendencies, believing that his 
Jewish heritage resurfaced “only incidentally” throughout his predominant legal career.199 
Lauterpacht’s most palpable reference to his Jewish heritage was made in Jerusalem in 1950, 
when he proclaimed, “Jews, individually and collectively, have played a leading role in 
making the natural rights of man part of the positive Law of Nations”.200 Following this 
declaration he made specific reference to Professor Feinberg and René Cassin, whom he 
believed symbolised the proud contributions of the Jewish community toward the promotion 
of international human rights.201 In this instance, Lauterpacht’s immediate aim to placate his 
Jewish audience must be appreciated. His rhetorical skills were similarly confirmed in 1949, 
in his draft speech for the Brazilian chancellor, Lord Jowitt. His opening address announced, 
“it is fitting that I should begin this address [...] by paying tribute to the memory of Ruy 
Barbosa, the great statesman and jurist of your country”.202  
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Lauterpacht’s dismissal of absolute state sovereignty and his philosophy of individual 
human rights were grounded more visibly in British academic culture, originating from his 
experiences at the London School of Economics (1923 – 1937) and Cambridge University 
(1937 – 1939). In these intellectual contexts Lauterpacht’s fertile mind was exposed to the 
ideologies of Hans Kelsen (1881 – 1973), Edward Hallet Carr (1892 – 1982), Arnold Duncan 
McNair (1885 – 1975), James Leslie Brierly (1881 – 1955) and the work of John Westlake 
(1828 – 1913). His membership of this elite class of British intellectuals was forged upon his 
election to the prestigious Whewell Chair at Cambridge in 1937 – a professorship that was 
formerly held by Westlake, Carr and his supervisor, McNair.203 On 3 December, Lauterpacht 
received a letter from Kelsen, “I fondly remember at this particular point in time with inner 
satisfaction, that you have been my student and that your writings echo my own intellect”.204 
In a similar vein, Lauterpacht’s individualism strongly resonated with Brierly’s legal 
teachings. In 1958, he laid particular emphasis on “the principal aspects of Brierly’s 
contribution” to international law, which was “the recognition of the individual”.205 Nearly 
three decades earlier, he drew similar sentiments from the Austrian born Jewish international 
lawyer, Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677) – “the function of law, Spinoza says, is to protect the 
individual”.206 Nuremberg can by no means be seen as the catalyst for Lauterpacht’s 
conception of individual criminal responsibility, which he had unquestionably acquired 
throughout his British education. It does however illuminate the extent to which his faith in 
the Nuremberg Trial, as a suitable foundation myth for ICC, was an “invented tradition”.  
In his analysis of Mare Liberum, Lauterpacht drew evidence from the Enlightenment 
and Victorian figures, Emerich de Vattel (1714 – 1767) and John Westlake in order to support  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his Grotian vision of human rights and the notion of “individual responsibility for criminal 
violations of international law”.207 While Lauterpacht often cited Vattel as an historical and 
institutional authority,208 Westlake was a more of an influence on his thinking. In his paper 
“Westlake and Present Day International Law” (1925), he underlined Westlake’s 
condemnation of “the claim that men, acting in groups not subject to regulation by a superior, 
can repudiate their personal responsibility”.209 This ideology persisted in Lauterpacht’s 1950 
edition of International Law and Human Rights, wherein he pronounced, “crimes against 
humanity are crimes regardless of whether they were committed in accordance with and in 
obedience to the national law of the accused”.210 Coincidently, these values resonated with the 
statements made by Sir Hartley Shawcross in 1951, for whom Lauterpacht had written draft 
speeches and advised at Nuremberg, “the criticism that soldiers were being punished simply 
for obeying their orders was wholly wrong”.211 He continued by asserting that “a soldier was 
bound only to obey a lawful order. There was no such thing as a duty of absolute 
obedience.”212 Both Westlake’s and Lauterpacht’s voices resonated within this passage. Even 
if Lauterpacht reinforced Bellot’s Victorian criticism against the Westphalian principle of 
absolute state sovereignty, his methods took a new path. Lauterpacht blurred the distinction 
between a “belligerent and a neutral” as a means of illustrating the universality of human 
rights – a direct contradiction to the humanitarian voice, which Bellot had derived from the 
teachings of Lieber’s Instructions.  
In contrast to Bellot, Lauterpacht did not employ humanitarianism to portray the ICC 
as above the realm of international politics. He was rather more forthright in his 
understanding of the ICC as a facilitator of international relations. “The punishment of war  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crimes committed by the enemy”, he wrote, “is a problem of politics rather than of law”.213 
Until his final years, international courts played an important role in his Kantian vision of 
international organisation after the Second World War. He adopted the phrase by Immanuel 
Kant (1724 – 1804) that “the public right ought to be founded upon a federation of states”.214 
Koskeniemi explains that Lauterpacht’s view of the relationship between the individual and 
the state was anchored by this “Federalist Utopia”.215 In 1951, a journalist for The Times 
wrote, “there was a need for a supranational organisation to which all nations, great and 
small, strong as well as weak, would be subject”.216 One year earlier, Lauterpacht had written: 
It is the abiding lesson of history […] that a world-embracing federation […] of which 
regional federations may be a necessary stage […] is, in the words of Immanuel Kant, 
the only means of attaining perfect internal government, which is, in turn, the 
essential condition of the realisation of the moral and intellectual capacities of 
mankind […] the relation between the individual human being and the federation 
would be more direct.217 
“Regional federations” were a “necessary stage” toward his Kantian dream of “perpetual 
peace”, as direct contact between the individual and international law was a long-term 
ambition that could not happen overnight. “This analogy between individuals and states”, he 
wrote, “has proved a beneficent weapon in the armoury of international progress”.218 Political 
integration and cooperation between states would be essential until the Great Powers had 
accepted the Nuremberg principles as law. This was a reflection of Westlake’s formative 
influence upon Lauterpacht’s legal thought. In his analysis of Westlake in 1925, Lauterpacht 
had noted: 
Neither individuals nor corporations other than States can […] come into direct 
contact within international law. Their rights, if any, grounded in international law, 
are not rights of international law, and their duties, if any, originating from 
international law, are not duties imposed by international law; these rights and duties  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must be transformed into rights and duties of municipal law in order to be enjoyed by 
or to be binding upon individuals.219 
He most strongly supported the integration of national and international courts in order to 
make the ICJ more feasible and appealing to national powers. In 1958, he used Brierly as a 
figurehead to support this plan for international organisation – “the practice of international 
law should touch the individual not directly, but only through the State to which he 
belongs”.220 Henceforth, even if Lauterpacht persistently upheld the individual as the base 
unit of international law, he was simultaneously aware that the immediate abandonment of the 
state was an unrealistic expectation. This was also the desire for many of Bellot’s 
contemporaries.  
The inability of the ICJ to generate international cooperation between states 
demonstrated the limits of both Lauterpacht’s Kantian vision of global order, and universal 
acceptance of the Nuremberg myth as a precedent upon which to model an ICC. Faith in the 
power of an ICC to bypass nation-states and enforce individual rights and responsibilities was 
significantly weakened when the ICJ failed in its basic task to hold states accountable under 
international law. The ICJ was based upon a rule of consent, and as such, was not successful 
in guaranteeing cooperation from sovereign states. This may explain why in 1958 Lauterpacht 
had also decided to emphasise Brierly’s “scepticism concerning the current proposals to 
establish an International Criminal Court”.221 While Lauterpacht had defended the principle of 
consent as a vital element of international law in 1934, his opinion shifted dramatically in 
1945. “There cannot be international security or any true evolution of the law”, he wrote, “if 
the future international organisation is to perpetuate […] the rights of sovereign States to 
remain judges in their own cause”.222 To that date “the Permanent Court of Justice has no 
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such power” to refuse the will of national powers.223 His former mentor, Kelsen believed that 
“a World State is not in the scope of political reality”.224 As a result of the amplified realism 
in international politics following the Second World War, Kelsen argued, “if peace is 
conceived as a state of absence of force, the law then provides only for relative, not for 
absolute, peace”.225 Lauterpacht understood this reality during his career as a judge on the ICJ 
(1955 – 1960). There were numerous episodes wherein the ineffectiveness and inability of the 
ICJ to settle political disputes were demonstrated across the globe. On 26 May 1951, the 
United Kingdom presented a case to the ICJ, in which “Persia is accused of a denial of 
justice, and a breach of treaty obligations”.226 The final judgement declared that the Court 
“lacks jurisdiction” for it did not possess the willing consent of the Persian Government.227 
However the Corfu Channel Case was an edifying success for the British Government: 
In a Judgment given on April 9th, 1949, the Court held Albania responsible, under 
international law, for the explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in 
Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life that resulted to the United 
Kingdom […] the Court therefore gives judgment in favour of the claim of the United 
Kingdom and condemns Albania to pay to that country a total compensation of  
£843,947.228 
 
In 1955, C. D’Oliver Farran wrote, “no one has ever been able to accuse this Court or any of 
its members of anything but the most scrupulous impartiality”.229 In the same year, The Times 
reminded its readers, “the Court has no coercive force to support its judgement”.230 In the 
Norwegian Loans Case between France and Norway, on 6 July 1957 it was decided once 
more that “the Court found by twelve votes to three that it was without jurisdiction to 
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adjudicate upon the dispute.”231 In the same year, the British Government announced that it 
“no longer accepts the Court’s jurisdiction” concerning matters that “affects the national 
security of the United Kingdom”.232 As a result, in The Development of International Law by 
the International Court (1958), Lauterpacht confessed that the ICJ “is of a voluntary 
character” and “the opportunities for exercising the jurisdiction of the Court are limited”.233 It 
was in his final years when Lauterpacht conceded, “it would be an exaggeration to assert that 
the Court [ICJ] has proved to be a significant instrument for maintaining international 
peace”.234 Proposals for the ICC faced strong opposition within this political context. There 
was strong doubt that the individual, as the lowest common denominator of international law, 
would become a foreseeable reality during the 1950s if the ICJ failed to deliver justice in such 
cases. The Nuremberg myth ultimately proved to be a fractured foundation upon which to 
build the ICC. 
In this chapter, Lauterpacht’s vision of individual human rights was employed to 
delineate a transformation in the ICC’s purpose since the 1920s. The Court’s function was not 
limited to humanising the laws of war, nor was it perceived to safeguard the sovereignty of 
Anglo-American civilisation. By the 1950s, such rhetoric was deemed archaic. In 
Lauterpacht’s era, the ICC was firmly grounded in a human rights discourse – the protection 
of individual rights and responsibilities. Lauterpacht recognised that such notions would have 
been considered “revolutionary” in Bellot’s era. It was Nuremberg that provided the ideal 
opportunity to plant human rights within an historical reality, one which maintained the 
power of collective experience. The entanglement of the ICC within the international human 
rights revolution prevented it from gaining strong support from national powers. Their 
entwined fates may help to explain the unexplored phenomenon of why these two projects  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had disappeared from the international vocabulary until the end of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, the wave of realpolitik that permeated the international political culture after the 
Second World War resulted in greater scrutiny upon the performance of the ICJ. Although 
possessing a different jurisdiction, the ICJ eventually came to be seen as a prototype of the 
ICC’s potential weaknesses by many of its critics. Lauterpacht, a perpetuator of the 
Nuremberg myth, on the other hand soon began to dispel the weaknesses and realities of a 
potential ICC through his criticisms of the ICJ. This alter ego Court became a ghost that 
prevailed and continued to haunt the ICC’s chance of ever becoming more than a reality on 
paper. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Legacy of the 1998 Rome Conference  
and the Invention of a Red Cross Tradition 
 
  
 
Humanitarianism likes to see itself in terms of pure virtue, a kind of anti-political gesture of 
compassionate brotherhood. – Mark Mazower.235 
  
 The historical account of the ICC’s genesis in the Red Cross Movement of the late 
nineteenth century was an “invented tradition” of the 1998 Rome Conference. Furthermore, 
this foundation myth served to dissipate political doubt of the Court’s humanitarian role in a 
decade when international politics were sharply divided between the competing demands of 
nation-states and non-government humanitarian organisations. In the 1990s, the universal 
humanitarian character of the Court was no longer anchored in Victorian upper-middle class 
ideology, nor the historic ideals of Hugo Grotius or Francis Lieber, from whom Bellot and 
Lauterpacht had drawn inspiration. Neither was the Court vested in Bellot’s Utilitarian 
conception of the Grotian Law of Nations, or in Lauterpacht’s Kantian Federalism. Up to that 
point in time, the fragmentation of the ICC’s ideological mission had been overwhelming, to 
the extent, that neither Bellot nor Lauterpacht were able to translate their own utopian visions 
of the Court into a reality. New conceptions of the past drew upon the power of collective 
experience and played a key role in the politics of consent at Rome. To borrow from Moyn’s 
words on contemporary human rights, the ICC was a “last utopia” in global politics.236 Many 
delegates at Rome saw the Court as a substitute for the United Nations, which had failed to  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prevent the atrocities of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. From an alternate view, the 
Court was a “strange triumph”. The suppression of political agency, on the behalf of “Civil 
Society”, was an essential compromise for the participation of national powers at the Rome 
Conference. In the collective mind of the Conference, the Red Cross tradition was a vital 
shield against negative perceptions of the Court as either a neo-imperialist project or a 
safeguard for absolute state sovereignty. 
Seventy-four years after Bellot’s original proposal at Stockholm, the United Nations 
convened a diplomatic conference to formally discuss the establishment of an ICC. From 15 
June to 17 July 1998, delegates from 148 western and non-western nations, 236 non-
government and 33 intergovernmental organisations united in Rome for this purpose.237 As 
Jouannet stated, “where in the nineteenth century one could still cite a few major 
commentators, it seems impossible” in the late twentieth century, “so plethoric has 
international law writing become.”238 Matos Fernandes, the national representative of 
Portugal observed in Rome, “the world entered a new century in an era of globalisation”.239 
This was the era in which “global citizenship” became a leading term. In contrast to 
Stockholm, the aim in Rome was not simply to create a blueprint for the Court, but to gain 
approval from an interdependent global community. As such, Kofi Annan called for universal 
ownership of the new world Court by highlighting the symbolic importance of “the Eternal 
City” – Rome.240 The world had assembled at the doorstep of the “universal empire” in a 
solemn effort to create a new institution. The intoxicating symbolism and grandeur of the 
event had motivated delegates such as Obed Asamoah, the representative of Ghana, and 
Valdis Birkavs, the representative of Latvia to remind others that “the Statute must not be                                                         
237 “United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court: Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records”, vol. 2. Summary 
records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole (New York: United 
Nations, 2002), pp. 5–44. 
238 Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations, p. 195. 
239 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.4 in “United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records”, 
vol. 2. Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole 
(New York: United Nations, 2002), p. 84. 
240 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.1, p. 61. 
54 
pushed through just for the sake of creating a symbolic entity” and furthermore “the 
establishment of an international criminal court should not be regarded as an end in itself”.241 
A mere three years earlier, Cherif Bassiounni, a War Crimes Specialist for the United Nations 
had voiced the imperative that an ICC should embody the “moral values commonly shared by 
the international polity”.242 These words echoed throughout the conference halls in Rome 
through the words of Yves Sandoz, representative for the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) when he claimed, “the key to its success lay in proving its competence and thus 
gaining the confidence of all”.243 Two days earlier, Michel Kafando, the national delegate of 
Burkina Faso, declared, “non-government organisations, particularly humanitarian bodies, 
had played a catalytic role in […] safeguarding peace and security and the protection of 
human rights”.244 From this evidentiary basis, LeBlanc noted that the latter half of the 
twentieth century emphasised the Court’s “humanitarian rather than its penal nature”.245  
Scholarship has extensively documented the identity crisis of international law in the 
post-Cold War era. At the time of the Rome Conference, international law was divided 
between the concerns of national powers and the humanitarian demands of international Civil 
Society. “Contemporary international law”, Jouannet observes, “is neither strictly welfarist 
law nor strictly liberal law, but indeed a liberal-welfarist law”.246 Michael Barnett, in his 
detailed account of international humanitarianism, perceived the manner in which “the world-
changing events of the 1990s”, most notably the ad hoc tribunals set up by the United Nations 
for the prosecution of genocide crimes in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, had “caused 
all humanitarian agencies to rethink their relationship to politics and in the process, their  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humanitarian identity”.247 Elizabeth Bogwardt, in her renowned work on the American 
genesis of contemporary human rights law, writes how “the Kantian vision of collective 
security may have to yield to the pluralistic vision offered by […] Civil Society”.248 In the late 
twentieth century, notions of collective security were not vested in Bellot’s Utilitarian 
conception of the Grotian tradition, or Lauterpacht’s Kantian Federalism. While these 
international lawyers had witnessed two very distinctive crises in the international legal fields 
of their own day, Stephen Neil Macfarlane and Yuen Foong Khong argue in their book 
Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (2006) that the paralysis of contemporary 
international law was due to the rise of “democratic pluralism” at the end of the twentieth 
century: a condition wherein the sovereignty of both states and individual human beings was 
paradoxically elevated.249 Four years prior to the Rome Conference, United Nations 
Specialists investigated this paradox in the “Human Development Report”.250 For many 
scholars, this report was a favourable point of reference to demarcate a shift in the 
international political vocabulary from the language of national to human security.251 
Furthermore, it marked the closing gap between international humanitarian and human rights 
law - “Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and 
dignity”.252 Bob Reinalda notes that “human security” was an anti-national term universally 
employed for “strengthening efforts to tackle issues such as war crimes and genocide and 
finally for preparing the ground for humanitarian intervention.”253 In 1993 Kenneth Roth, the 
Executive director of Human Rights Watch, maintained that the language of human rights had 
not changed, however, it had acquired a new humanitarian significance due to the global  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NGO movement.254 For this reason, Emma Rothschild argued in 1995 that formerly 
marginalised non-government groups developed greater agency in the new era of global 
politics, and contested that the “NGO wave can be seen as a result of many governments’ will 
to withdraw from global action” in humanitarian emergencies.255 In this respect, a primary 
concern for the delegates in Rome was to overcome the “liberal-welfarist” crisis of 
international law through a politics of consent. Hence, a member of the Non-Government 
Organisation Coalition for an International Criminal Court had pledged on the afternoon of 15 
June that “global civil society […] would work tirelessly with Governments and international 
organisations to achieve such a great, historic result”.256 
The Rome Conference was the first moment when contemporary associations 
between the ICRC and the ICC were drawn. The Court’s humanitarian identity sought to 
unify national interests with those of Civil Society - a rhetorical counterweight to the “liberal-
welfarist” conception of international law. On the afternoon of 16 June, Cornelia Sommaruga, 
a representative of the ICRC, announced that the Conference was “reiterating the firm support 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross” and that “by virtue of its mandate to work 
for the faithful application of international humanitarian law, his organisation supported 
moves to set up” an ICC.257 Two days after Sommaruga’s declaration, Mariapia Garavaglia, 
member of the same delegation made particular reference to the events of November 1997, 
wherein: 
The 175 national societies of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, the 
International Federation and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
had adopted a resolution calling on national societies to promote the 
establishment of an effective and impartial international criminal court. The 
120 million volunteers of the Red Cross and Red Crescent were waiting for  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a strong political message on the prevention and punishment of violations 
of international humanitarian law.258 
 
The vitality of the Red Cross in the creation of an ICC was not limited to the voices 
from the ICRC. Various national representatives at Rome also hinged their enthusiasm for an 
ICC upon the aspirations of the Red Cross. René Novella, the representative for Monaco, 
announced that his country wished to participate in the historic construction of an ICC, “in 
keeping with his country’s longstanding involvement in […] the international Red Cross 
conventions.”259 When proposing a few amendments for the draft Statute of the ICC, Garcia 
Labajo, the Spanish national representative, hoped that they “would meet with support, as 
their general purpose was to reflect the […] activities of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross”.260 Yunus Bazel, Afghanistan’s national representative, was so supportive of the 
inclusion of the Red Cross in the ICC’s humanitarian function that he proposed “a provision 
for referral by the International Committee of the Red Cross”.261 In this respect, the ICC 
would be truly seen as an extension of the ICRC’s political reach. From these instances, one 
may deduce that the promotions of the Red Cross as a founding humanitarian symbol of the 
Court was not entirely to serve the self-seeking ambition of delegates on behalf of the ICRC.  
The manner in which various groups used the Red Cross as a foundation myth to 
dispel political doubt of the Court’s role in voicing the humanitarian concerns of Civil Society 
during the late twentieth century is an area unchartered by historians. Many delegates 
understood that the Court’s legitimacy was vested in the force of its history. This offered an 
indelible stamp to the memory of generations. On the opening morning of the Conference in  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1998, Annan began the proceedings by declaring that “the road leading to the holding of the 
Conference” had passed through “some of the darkest moments in human history” and was 
“stimulated by the hard work of the Red Cross”.262 Historical accounts that describe a 
genealogy between the ICC and the ICRC are a recent trend of the post-Rome era. Bellot used 
John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1690) to illustrate the English origins of the 
United States Supreme Court, and Lauterpacht traced the beginnings of a Western liberal 
human rights discourse to Grotius’s Mare Liberum (1609) in order to provide the Nuremberg 
myth with an historical resonance. Likewise contemporary legal scholars have employed the 
work of Gustave Moynier (1826 – 1910), Swiss international lawyer, member of the Institut 
de Droit International and President of the ICRC,263 in order to argue the ICC’s historical 
roots in the Red Cross Movement of the late nineteenth century.264 The Rome myth is a 
“Whig” interpretation of the ICC’s history, one that views the Rome conference as an 
inevitable outcome of Moynier’s 1872 proposal to build an international tribunal for the 
purpose of enforcing the humanitarian principles of the 1864 Geneva Conventions. Legal 
historians Sir Arthur Watts and William Schabas both endorse this narrative. Watts attempts 
no explanation of why the ICC “has been slow to gather sufficient momentum”, and 
alternatively Schabas argues that “Monnier’s innovative proposal was much too radical for its 
time”.265 These writers consider the ICC’s ancestry from the Red Cross to be self-evident.  
Christopher Keith Hall posited the most extensive scholarly defence of the Rome 
myth in his paper The First Proposal for an International Criminal Court (1998), published 
in the International Review of the Red Cross. “A century and a quarter after Gustave  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Moynier’s daring proposal,” he wrote, “more than three hundred non-governmental 
organisations throughout the world have joined forces in an NGO Coalition for an 
International Criminal Court.”266 In his eyes, it was the duty of the Rome delegates to “draft a 
statute worthy of Moynier’s vision.”267 The evidentiary backbone of Hall’s argument rests on 
an English translation from the original French text of Moynier’s 1872 proposal, which at no 
point makes explicit reference to the Court’s “criminal” or “penal” nature.268 Moynier’s 
generation commonly referred to his proposal as the “Geneva tribunal”.269 Not once was it 
officially labelled as an ICC. Even if the original French text outlines the proposal as a 
“tribunal”,270 writers for the Pall Mall Gazette described the idea as a “committee”, rather 
than an actual court of law.271 The only two consistencies between Moynier’s vision and the 
Rome Statute were the “international” and “permanent” aspects of each proposal. Mark 
Kertsen thus argues that Moynier’s vision was a “forerunner to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice”.272 This collective belief, however, relies upon two assumptions. Firstly, 
that the Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920 had based their propositions for a PCIJ upon 
their perceptions of Moynier’s proposal or the legacies of the Red Cross. As shown from the 
verbatim reports of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, published by the Van Langenhaysen 
Brothers at The Hague in 1920, this was not the case, as these reports pay no credence to 
either Moynier or the Red Cross.273 Secondly, it presumes that the PCIJ and the ICC can be 
conflated into one historical continuity. As previously discussed, not only were 
acknowledgements of the Red Cross entirely absent from Bellot’s written works, but his own 
proposal for an ICC, far from praising the PCIJ, was a reaction against it. In his eyes, the PCIJ  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had failed to uphold his liberal vision of Anglo-America. Essentially Bellot’s notion of an 
ICC was not so much to create an “organ” of the PCIJ, as it was to produce its alter ego. 
These observations cast doubt over the conventional wisdom of modern scholarship to 
alternatively suggest that the ICC’s birth cannot be directly interpreted from the origins of the 
Red Cross. The Rome myth should not be considered an uncovered universal truth, but an 
artefact of international Civil Society in the late 1990s.  
The Court’s lineage from the Red Cross is conspicuously absent from historical 
records. Evidence indicates that neither Bellot or Lauterpacht considered the humanitarian 
legacy of the Red Cross when comprehending their own visions for an ICC. Bellot’s liberal 
vision of Anglo-American civilisation and Lauterpacht’s faith in the Nuremberg myth were 
ideologically fractured foundations upon which to build international support for the creation 
of an ICC. However these fractured foundations are in fact instrumental in answering the 
question of why the Court remained dormant for such an extended period of time. The Rome 
myth silenced these histories of conflict. While Lieber’s Instructions was the linchpin of 
Bellot’s humanitarian knowledge on “the laws of humanity” and was furthermore a critical 
point of reference in his vindication against statehood, the Prussian theory of war and his 
defence for the sanctity of Anglo-American civilisation, it is important to note that for many 
contemporaries of the late nineteenth century, Lieber and Moynier were regarded as similar 
minds, both in spirit and intellect.274 In 1880, The Oxford Journal wrote: 
The Institut de Droit International […] the codification of international law 
and the spread of its principles are among the objects proposed by the 
society. The idea of such a society seems to first have occurred to Dr. 
Lieber and M. [Gustave] Moynier, the founder of the Red Cross 
Societies.275 
 
In addition, Moynier co-authored ‘Appeal to the Belligerents’ for Institut de Droit 
International – a document bearing a resemblance in its line of thought to Lieber’s 
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Instructions.276 While this text did not receive the same grandiose international recognition as 
Lieber’s work, journalists for the Leeds Mercury observed in 1877: 
‘Appeal to the Belligerents’ […] this document, it may be remembered, 
aimed at defining and summarising the laws of warfare as based […] 
among civilised peoples […] M.M. [Gustave] Moynier and Rolin 
Jaequemyns were instructed to draw up a further declaration on the 
subject.277 
 
This document was by no means held up in comparison to Lieber’s Instructions at the time. 
While Moynier and Lieber shared similar passions for humanitarianism and international law, 
their historical relationship should not be overstated. It cannot be questioned that Bellot 
borrowed heavily from Lieber, was aware of the influence of the 1864 Geneva Conventions 
upon the work of the 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences at The Hague, and was himself a 
member of Institut de Droit International.278 Nevertheless he did not once throughout his 
entire career refer to either Moynier or the Red Cross as vital sources of inspiration, nor did 
his contemporaries at the Stockholm Conference lend support to their relevance when 
discussing the constitutional architecture of an ICC. The forgotten histories of individuals 
such as Bellot suggests that the Court’s genesis cannot be directly traced to the late nineteenth 
century Red Cross, as traditionally believed. 
Lauterpacht wrote in International Law and Human Rights (1950) that the 
“precarious doctrine” of “humanitarian intervention” sought its primary influence from the 
work of Grotius, which was grounded in the “defense of human rights”.279 Even if these 
words echoed the thoughts of Jean S. Pictet (1914 – 2002), international Swiss lawyer and 
Vice-President of the ICRC, who in the same year had written in the Red Cross Principles 
(1950) that, “humanitarian law includes […] the law of war, consisting mainly of the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions, and […] the rules for the safeguard of human rights”, it is evident 
that neither Lauterpacht or Pictet drew a conscious link between the ICRC and an ICC, as  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made at the 1998 Rome Conference and by subsequent legal scholars.280 Henceforth, while 
Barnett talks with specific reference to Henry P. Davison’s (1867 – 1922) leadership of an 
“American-led Red Cross” after the First World War, it was also apparent that the Red Cross 
“was quite willing to follow its identity into new areas” in the late 1990s.281 
It cannot be claimed that the foundation myth of the Red Cross was the entirely 
spontaneous invention of the Rome delegates. Many of the ideas of the Rome myth had 
already blossomed from the crosspollination of humanitarian traditions and pre-existing 
human rights ideology. Notions connected with the ICC shifted into a new humanitarian 
setting as a result of the interaction with the international Civil Society in the 1990s. Just as 
Mazower argued that the League of Nations served as an incubator for the creation of the 
United Nations in 1945, so too had the Nuremberg Myth facilitated the emergence of the Red 
Cross tradition in 1998. As a result of the ICC’s entanglement within a Western liberal human 
rights discourse during the mid-twentieth century, the Court’s historical association with the 
ICRC rose in parallel with a refashioning of human rights ideology from a predominantly 
moral notion to an enforceable humanitarian concept at the close of the twentieth century. An 
example of this is the way Annan cited the Nuremberg tribunals and the Red Cross as twin 
pillars for understanding the Court’s historical identity.282 In this case, the Red Cross was not 
used so much a substitute for the Nuremberg myth, as it was an additional reinforcement of 
the ICC’s humanitarian character. Many delegates in Rome continued to support the 
relevance of the Nuremberg trials in articulating the Court’s purpose. French representative, 
Béatrice Le Fraper Du Hellen was not a lone voice when she stated on the morning of 16 
June, “France felt that the Statute should go at least as far as the Nuremberg Charter”.283 
Concurring with these sentiments Swiss representative, Jakob Kellenberger, shared the 
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common view that “individual criminal responsibility, foreshadowed by Nuremberg” was a 
significant foundation upon which to base the Rome Statute.284 Representatives from China, 
Cuba, Singapore and Greece however were “unconvinced by the argument concerning the 
precedent set by the Nuremberg Trials”, as they had transpired from a “specific historical 
background”.285 
The ICC’s humanitarian Red Cross identity related to the Nuremberg myth was 
interpreted in a new historical light in Rome. The spirit of the myth evolved with context. For 
many of the Rome delegates, Nuremberg represented the convergence of international human 
rights and international humanitarian law – an attitude that was historically resonant with the 
international political culture of Civil Society and the new monolithic concept “human 
security”. For instance, Mohammad Aziz Shukri, speaking on behalf of the Syrian Arab 
Republic, argued that the Nuremberg Trials were a critical foundation of the Court, which 
conveyed an “overlap between crimes coming under the heading of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of human rights”.286 While many in Rome believed that Nuremberg 
was foundational in the ICC’s history, its impact upon the collective memory of the ICC’s 
identity was more subtle than traditional views have claimed. The Nuremberg myth exhibited 
a relatively minimal short-term influence upon international public opinion in the 1950s. This 
was because it failed to produce confidence in the creation of an ICC, due to the widespread 
frustration exhibited by national powers, who criticised the inability of the ICJ to pass 
effective and ruling judgements upon the global community. 
To date, no historian has explored whose interests the Rome myth served; the 
multiple roles it may have performed at the Conference; and how it had helped the delegates 
to identify the Courts political function. New historical interpretations arise when the Rome 
myth is understood as a strategic interpretation of the ICC’s past, as opposed to being entirely  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the natural progeny of an evolving international political culture. The current chapter has thus 
far investigated the extent to which the Rome myth was an “invented tradition” of the late 
twentieth century. Furthermore, it was revealed how on a preliminary level the Red Cross was 
an anti-national platform commonly employed for articulating the Court’s humanitarian 
purpose, which sought to overcome the “liberal-welfarist” crisis in international law by 
unifying the collective interests of both national powers and the members of Civil Society in 
Rome.  
The following section will investigate the extent to which the Rome myth was a cover 
to cushion the blows of competing political hierarchies and claims of sovereignty between the 
United Nations and Civil Society. From one perspective, the ICC was considered to be a “last 
utopia”. Just as Moyn has argued that “human rights were born as an alternative to grand 
political missions” and the “fall of prior utopias”, so too was the ICC envisioned by many 
delegates in Rome to be a substitute for the United Nations.287 In this respect, the ICC was not 
a “utopia” that had triumphed in its own merits, rather it was viewed as a “last resort”.288 For 
many contemporaries of Bellot’s and Lauterpacht’s, the PCIJ and the ICJ had led public 
opinion to believe that the creation of an ICC was both an impractical and undesirable 
endeavour during the 1920s and 1950s. By the 1990s, international public opinion had turned 
and the ICJ was no longer a ghost that haunted the prospects of an ICC from ever becoming 
more than a reality on paper. Only in a few instances at the Rome Conference had the ICJ 
been cited warning against the creation of at ICC. On 17 June, Kamel Hassan Al-Maghur, the 
representative for the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stated that “his country had submitted five 
issues to the International Court of Justice” wherein “States had used their influence in the 
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[Security] Council to impede the work of the ICJ even before the cases had started”.289 For 
this reason, he “warned against the adoption of anything in the Statute” of an ICC that “might 
encourage such conduct”.290 However the ineffectiveness of the ICJ was not the primary 
cause for concern in Rome that it once had been in Lauterpacht’s final decade. The main issue 
in question became the Court’s direct relationship with the UN. Majority opinion in Rome 
supported Reinalda’s view that, “the United Nations itself as an organisation is far from 
equipped for such [humanitarian] interventions.”291 Mary Robinson, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights confessed that “the United Nations had had a poor record in 
preventing violations of human rights” – words that reflected the genocides committed in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.292 A. Abdullah, the representative for Afghanistan, believed 
that these “tragic events” had occurred because “United Nations resolutions had gone 
unheeded”.293 As such, Robinson believed that the creation of an ICC would symbolise a 
“break in the past” wherein “political will and an effective weapon against the culture of 
impunity had all been lacking”.294 Paskal Milo, the national representative of Albania 
prefaced his remarks by stating that civil society “was increasingly concerned about the 
failure of the international community to prevent the continuing serious violations of 
international humanitarian law”.295 Marcel Dubouloz, calling attention to his own experiences 
as a member of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission stated that “the 
establishment of an international criminal court was certainly the missing element”.296 
However, just as Bellot had realistically recognised that his statute for an ICC needed to pay  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homage to the PCIJ, or otherwise be immediately swept under the carpet, so too had Lloyd 
Axworthy, the representative for Canada pointed to the uncompromising reality that “the 
Court would need to have a constructive relationship with the United Nations”.297 Mohammah 
Zamir, the representative for Bangladesh concurred in his belief that “global participation” 
would be necessary in the new Court.298 
“Global participation” was to be delivered at high political price. Taking an 
alternative perspective, the implementation of the ICC could be viewed a “strange triumph” in 
1998. Just as Mazower has argued that a “weaker” United Nations was a necessary cost for 
the involvement of the United States and Soviet Russia in 1945, so too was the diminished 
political agency of Civil Society an essential compromise for the participation of national 
powers at the Rome Conference.299 The role of governments in manipulating the Rome myth 
has been unduly ignored by historians. While the Red Cross was invoked as an anti-political 
symbol of Civil Society’s integral role in the proceedings of the Conference and the cultural 
fabric of the Court itself, the rule implemented in Rome was that all non-government 
organisations would only possess the capacity to “participate as observers, without the right to 
vote” and then “through a limited number of their representatives, oral statements” could be 
made only “as appropriate”.300 Civil Society was to have no direct influence or the power to 
make executive decisions in dictating the words of the Rome Statute. In light of these 
limitations, the Rome myth may be interpreted as a tool that was used for masking the reality 
that national sovereignty was in no true sense threatened by the presence of non-government 
organisations at the Conference and Antoine Cassese’s bold claim that the ICC “is a 
revolutionary institution that intrudes into state sovereignty” is ostensibly overstated.301 The 
contrivance of history and proclamations of the Courts ancestry from the Red Cross were  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antidotes to this political reality. As such, Peraza Chapeau, the representative of Cuba, had 
duly noted that the “International Criminal Court could not be separate from the States that 
created it”.302 The Rome myth was not so much a solution to the “liberal-welfarist” crisis in 
international law, as it was an insurance policy designed to safeguard national sovereignty by 
placating Civil Society’s desire for global recognition. In parallel to the PCIJ of Bellot era, 
the ICC had become the maxim of self-seeking nationalism that Civil Society had sought to 
replace. 
In this chapter, the foundation myth of the Red Cross was used to investigate the 
politics of consent in Rome and proves critical to understanding the newfound purpose of the 
Court at the close of the twentieth century. The universal humanitarian character of this Court 
was not anchored in the historic ideals of Hugo Grotius or Francis Lieber, from whom 
Lauterpacht and Bellot had drawn inspiration. Neither was the Court vested in Bellot’s 
Utilitarian conception of the Grotian Law of Nations, or in Lauterpacht’s Kantian Federalism. 
These utopias did not have currency in Rome. The emphasis on the Court’s humanitarian 
identity was an antidote to the “liberal-welfarist” crisis in international law. By 1998, the ICC 
had become a Court of compromise with various intersecting agendas. For some, the 
Conference was a genuine advance against state sovereignty, while for others it was an 
overtly symbolic event that tamed Civil Society’s frustrated call for political recognition in a 
globalised world. Its newly discovered position in the realm of diplomacy was arguably one 
reason why the Court was no longer emphatically compared with the ICJ, but rather the 
United Nations, an administrative global political body. Just as Bellot’s proposal for an ICC 
was a substitute for the PCIJ, so too were many NGOs in Rome challenging the sovereignty 
of the United Nations. In a neat paradox, the new Court adopted the maxim of political 
compromise that activist members of Civil Society had sought to eradicate. In this sense, the 
ICC of 1998 was not so much a “revolutionary” institution but a “strange triumph”. 
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Conclusion 
 
From “Minor Utopias” to “the Last Utopia” 
A Ladder of Foundation Myths 
 
  
 
The histories of Bellot and Lauterpacht have each revealed fragmentation in the 
Court’s historical trajectory – demonstrating firstly, that the processes of myth-construction 
are a critical lens for interpreting and dissecting the conventional Whig narratives of the 
Court’s development; and secondly, these processes fundamentally contributed to the ICC’s 
enduring identity crisis throughout the previous century. Ultimately, the politics of 
international consent proved to be far more influential than any individual myth-maker. This 
factor was crucial to the establishment of the ICC. In this climate, the collective membership 
and grandeur of the 1998 Rome Conference was orchestrated to revive the historical and 
political credibility of the ICC in the post-Cold War era.  
A thorough analysis of the official Rome Treaty archives, British newspapers of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as the published and miscellaneous writings of 
figures who were closely involved in the ICC’s progress and development bring us to an 
appreciation of the legacy of the Rome Conference in a new light. Kofi Annan was indeed 
justified in believing that he had witnessed an “historic milestone” on the morning of 15 June 
1998,303 as it was the first moment in which the idea of an ICC had found traction with the 
international community. Contrary, however, to the orthodox wisdom of contemporary legal 
scholarship, the Conference cannot be seen to be the direct result of The Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the birth of the PCIJ in 1920, or the long-term realisation of 
the innovative “Geneva Tribunal” proposed by Moynier during his career as a leading figure 
of the late nineteenth century Red Cross movement. These provide convenient precedents, as  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opposed to accounts of the past. Based on this hypothesis, this thesis has approached recent 
literature on the Court’s genesis within the Red Cross movement as primary sources of the 
decade in which they were written. 
The ICC was a concept that attracted and embodied a vast array of competing values 
across separate generations. This resulted in different perceptions of the Court’s history, 
purpose and legitimacy, and furthermore was instrumental in the Court’s delayed evolution 
from Stockholm to Rome. As established in Chapter One, Bellot’s vision for an ICC was 
buried beneath a set of competing myths and the traditions of international civilisation that 
emerged in Europe after the First World War. His faith in the overarching liberal 
internationalism of Lieber’s humanitarianism and his utilitarian conception of the Grotian law 
of nations, challenged the “Westaphalian myth” of absolute state sovereignty, and the ideals 
of Wilsonian liberalism expounded at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It was within this 
political and intellectual framework that Bellot saw the PCIJ as a threat to his own Victorian 
upper-middle class perception of Anglo-American civilisation. By contrast, Lauterpacht 
hinged the Court’s history within a human rights discourse during the mid-twentieth century, 
when the idiom of civilisation had run its course in global politics. As such, he believed the 
ICC’s primary function was to protect individual rights and responsibilities under the 
umbrella of international law. Nuremberg provided the ideal opportunity for Lauterpacht to 
plant human rights within an historical reality, one which maintained the power of collective 
experience. Regrettably, the Nuremberg myth offered yet another fractured foundation upon 
which to generate international enthusiasm for the creation of an ICC. Human rights were 
themselves a “strange triumph”, and the UN recognised the weakness of the ICJ as indicative 
of an ICC’s potential failure.304  
Despite mixed outcomes both the PCIJ and the ICJ were Courts that addressed nation 
states, and respectively, were institutions that triumphed in decades when group rights and the 
“interstate classical liberal conception” of international law were the touchstones of global  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politics.305 From the mid-twentieth century onwards, in response to a different epoch, the 
notion of an ICC evolved to encompass the evolution of individual rights. Conflating the 
ICC’s historical development within a broad teleology of building international tribunals 
overlooks this observation and the ICC’s contentious relationships with the PCIJ and the ICJ. 
Bellot’s contemporaries blurred the edges between the PCIJ and the ICC, and in doing so, 
significantly obstructed the creation of an ICC in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
To formally differentiate his own statute from the pre-existing PCIJ, Bellot stressed the ICC’s 
“criminal” jurisdiction. Even in the 1950s when the ICC transformed into an institutional 
expression of rights, Lauterpacht’s contemporaries persisted in drawing analogies between 
the ICC and the ICJ, despite their separate legal jurisdictions. Eventually this resulted in 
widespread doubt among UN delegates over the prospect of an effective ICC.  
This thesis has examined historical tensions between the Court’s evolutionary and 
revolutionary character. The idea of an ICC shifted between evolving institutional expressions 
of international morality and new machinations of anti-national rhetoric throughout the 
twentieth century – from Bellot’s ideals of “humanity” and civilisation; to Lauterpacht’s 
idiom of “human rights”; and finally, to the monolithic notion of “human security”, which 
reflected the intellectual environs of an increasingly globalised community in the late 1990s. 
Bellot’s vision of Anglo-American civilisation did not adapt to new political contexts in the 
same manner achieved by the Nuremberg myth. The meaning of the Nuremberg myth was 
modified between periods and adopted a new historical significance at the 1998 Rome 
Conference, when human rights had transformed into an enforceable humanitarian concept. In 
this regard, the ICC’s entanglement within a human rights discourse in the mid-twentieth 
century possessed a lasting legacy, one that significantly impacted upon the Court’s historical 
trajectory and fuelled fresh interpretations of the Court’s genesis within the Red Cross 
movement of the late nineteenth century. Whilst possessing a weak evidentiary basis, this 
foundation myth was interwoven into the collective values of the Rome Conference, and as  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such, was authorised by the Rome delegates and legal scholars. This “invented tradition” was 
a signature of contemporary international Civil Society, as it had been co-authored by the 
consenting national powers at Rome. In 1998, the visions of Bellot and Lauterpacht suffered 
final defeat to “the last utopia”.306 The Court was entwined with contemporary human rights 
law, evolving into the safeguard of national sovereignty it had vowed to oppose. 
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